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INTRODUCTION
For nearly twenty years, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) and the states have been engaged in a bitter "border
war." The combatants have repeatedly clashed over two related issues: what
is the dividing line between federal and state jurisdiction over telecommuni-
cations services and equipment' and, once that line is established, when
may the FCC enter state "territory" to preempt regulations that are
inconsistent with federal policies?2
1. As used in this Article, the term "telecommunications services" refers to basic
communications transport and enhanced services. The term does not include cable,
broadcast, or other types of service subject to FCC regulation. The term "telecommunica-
tions equipment" refers to customer premises equipment, inside wiring, and network
switching and transport facilities. Except where otherwise noted, all references and
conclusions in this Article are limited to regulations governing the provision of telecom-
munications services and equipment by federally regulated common carriers, such as AT&T,
the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), and the independent telephone companies.
2. Telecommunications regulation is not the only area in which difficult issues of
federal-state relations have had to be resolved. See generally Anna Mastracco et al., Federal
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Three recent appellate decisions-Georgia Public Service Commission
v. FCC (Georgia PSC),3 California II,4 and California !! 5--provide an
opportunity to bring the long-running dispute to an end. These decisions
represent the culmination of a process by which the federal courts have
clarified the principles governing FCC-state relations. These principles
provide that the FCC and the states have control over telecommunications
facilities and services within their respective jurisdictions. They further
provide that the FCC is required to accept divergent state policies regarding
intrastate common carrier facilities and services, but that where state
regulation threatens to displace the FCC's jurisdiction over interstate
common carriers, the FCC may carefully-but forcefully--exercise its
preemptive power.
This Article first reviews the basis and history of the federal-state
conflict, with particular emphasis on the three most recent judicial
decisions. It then lays out a workable set of principles, grounded firmly in
the case law, that can provide a basis for the cessation of hostilities
between the FCC and the states. The Article concludes by highlighting
several additional jurisdictional issues that will have to be resolved in the
coming years.
I. THE TWENTY YEARS' WAR
The federal-state conflict has followed a classic format. After
experiencing initial victories, an over-confident FCC ventured far into state
territory. Thus overextended, the Commission was unable to withstand the
inevitable state counter-attack. Stung by several sharp defeats, the FCC
strategically retreated, dug in, and successfully fended off further state
efforts to redraw the jurisdictional map.
A. Origins and Basis of the FCC-State Conflict
The origins of this dispute go back to 1934, when Congress enacted
the Communications Act." In adopting the Act, Congress had to make a
and State Coordination: A Survey ofAdministrative Law Schemes, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 385
(1994) (describing the means by which jurisdictional conflicts have been resolved in
aviation, trade, education, health, safety, and other areas).
3. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. 92-8257, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24458 (11th Cir.
Sept. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Georgia PSC].
4. California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter California 11].
5. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter California IH],petition
for cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2435 (Apr. 3, 1995).
6. For a description of the origin and adoption of the Communications Act, see
generally MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDEAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2.1.A
(1992) and Richard R. McKenna, Preemption Under the Communications Act, 37 FED.
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decision: How would it divide the communications regulatory "turf"
between the newly created FCC and the existing state regulatory authori-
ties? Pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause,7 Congress
presumably could have ceded control over the entire field to the FCC,
leaving no room for state regulation! Alternatively, Congress might have
divided responsibility between the FCC and the states, but authorized the
FCC to displace any inconsistent state regulation.9 Congress, however,
chose neither of these approaches.1"
COMM. L.J. 1, 7-18 (1985). The relevant legislative materials are compiled in MAX D.
PAGLiN, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMuNICATIONs ACT OF 1934 (1989). At the
present time, Congress is considering fundamental reform of the Act. Any legislation that
is enacted could alter the balance of power between the FCC and the states.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. See City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1987) (quoting Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) [hereinafter Louisiana]) ("[When the FCC is]
'acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority [it] may pre-empt state
regulation' and hence render unenforceable state or local laws that are otherwise not
inconsistent with federal law."). Compare Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977)
(express statutory provision preempts state regulation) with Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947) (federal law "occupying the field" implicitly preempts state regulation).
9. There was ample precedent for this approach. Under the Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309,
§ 7, 36 Stat. 539 (1910), which was in effect between 1910 and 1934, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was given authority to regulate interstate telecommunications.
The ICC's regulatory authority, which included the right to review tariffs and order
interconnection, was based on the agency's existing authority to regulate the railroad
industry. In the Shreveport Rate Case, the Supreme Court upheld the power of the ICC to
regulate rates for the transportation by rail of goods wholly within a single state on the
grounds that such rates could "affect" interstate commerce. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry.
v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). Like the transportation of goods by railroad, the
transport of information by wire or radio--even if physically intrastate-has an effect on
interstate commerce. The ICC, therefore, could have used its authority under the Mann-
Ellins Act to regulate intrastate telephone service. The agency did not, however, choose to
do so.
10. Indeed, the possibility ofpreserving the jurisdictional arrangement that existed under
the Mann-Elldns Act was expressly rejected. See Regulation of Interstate and Foreign
Communications by Wire or Radio: Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 156, 179 (1934) (colloquy between Sens. Dill and Long
noting that the proposed Act would provide "[p]rotection against the Shreveport decision'
in the telecommunications area); 78 CONG. REc. 8816-23 (1934) (statement of Senate
Commerce Committee Chairman Dill introducing the Communications Act) ("Mhe
Interstate Commerce Commission, through the Shreveport decision... has gone so far in
the regulation of railroads that the so-called 'State Regulation' amounts to very little....
[T]he State commission representatives were jealous, in the preparation of the bill, that those
rights should be protected; and we have attempted to do that."); see also Computer &
Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 216 n.99 (D.C. Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
CCLI] ("Congress may well have intended Section 2(b) of the Communications Act to
prevent... [the Shreveport] result in the communications area.'), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
938 (1983); North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1047 (4th Cir.)
[hereinafter NCUC II] ("In enacting the Communications Act, Congress sought to deny the
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What Congress did do was to create a system of "dual jurisdiction"
over communications. Section 1 of the Communications Act grants the
FCC authority to "regulat[e] interstate and foreign... communication by
wire and radio."1 At the same time, Section 2(b)(1) of the Act states that
"nothing in this Act shall be construed ... to give the Commission
jurisdiction with respect to... charges, classifications, practices, services,
facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication
service of any carrier.""
The Communications Act thus appears to divide the communications
world "neatly into two hemispheres-one comprised of interstate service,
over which the FCC would have plenary authority, and the other made up
of intrastate service, over which the states would retain exclusive juris-
diction."13 However, if Congress hoped to create a clearly marked border
and to erect armed fortifications that would keep the FCC and the states on
their respective sides, its efforts were destined to fail. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the "realities of technology and economics" make
"such a clean parcelling of responsibility" impossible.14
The reason is simple: the same facilities are used to provide both
interstate and intrastate telecommunications services. Thus, a telephone
subscriber in Los Angeles must use the same customer premises equipment
(CPE),15 the same inside wiring," the same "local loop," 7 and the same
central office switching facilities"8 to call San Francisco as he does to call
New York City. This creates two distinct problems.
FCC of the kind of jurisdiction over local rates approved by the Shreveport Rate Case."),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (emphasis added). Section 4(i) of the Act further states that
"(t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue
such orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions." 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (1988).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
13. Louisiana, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986).
14. Id.
15. Customer premises equipment (CPE), often referred to as terminal equipment, is
communications equipment that is located on the subscriber's premises. CPE includes simple
telephone handsets as well as more sophisticated equipment such as modems, multiplexers,
and private branch exchanges.
16. Inside wiring is the physical transmission path located on the customer's premises
that connects CPE to the network.
17. The local loop is the physical transmission path from a subscriber's premises to the
central office of the local exchange carrier (LEC).
18. Switching facilities are used to route communications "traffic" from the LEC's
central office towards its destination.
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1. How Can the Federal-State Boundary be Determined?
As is the case with many border wars, the first matter in contention
between the FCC and the states is where the boundary line between the two
jurisdictions lies. Although Congress may have wished it to be otherwise,
the location of the border is not immediately obvious. In the above
example, the CPE, inside wiring, local loop, and switches used by the caller
in Los Angeles are physically present within California. Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of the calls carried over these facilities are likely
to terminate within the state.'9 Therefore, regulatory authority over these
facilities (and the services provided over them) could be assigned
exclusively to the intrastate jurisdiction. On the other hand, because these
facilities are used to transport some calls that cross state lines, they could
be considered to be within the federal regulatory domain.
The difficulty of "mapping the boundaries" between the federal and
state domains has been compounded by the growth of enhanced services,
which combine basic communications transport with computer processing
applications.20 When a subscriber in Los Angeles places a telephone call
to San Francisco, it is usually safe to assume, the transmission does not
leave California; when he calls New York, the transmission assuredly
crosses the state line. In contrast, when a researcher in Los Angeles
accesses a nationwide electronic information service, she may interact-in
the course of a single on-line session-with a "gateway" menu in
Baltimore, a local server in Beverly Hills, and a remote database in Boston,
without ever knowing from where the information has come. Indeed, even
the local exchange carrier (LEC) that provides the connection from the
researcher's home to the information service provider's local "point of
presence" may be unable to determine whether any of the information that
it is carrying to the subscriber originated outside the state.21
19. At the time the Communications Act was adopted; approximately 98% of all
telephone calls originated and terminated within the same state. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note
6, § 2.6. Even today, 85% of all basic voice calls originate and terminate within the same
jurisdiction. See FCC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DrV., TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERViCE 26
(1994).
20. The FCC has defined enhanced services as:
services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate
communications, which employ computer processing applications that act on the
format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted
information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured
information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1994).
21. But see infra text accompanying notes 226-31 (discussing the effect of advanced
intelligent network technology on the ability to determine the jurisdictional nature of a
462 [Vol. 47
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2. When is FCC Preemption Permissible?
The location of the border between the interstate and the intrastate
jurisdictions is not the only point of contention between the two sides.
Regulation of jointly used facilities (or the services provided over them) by
state regulatory authorities can significantly affect the FCC's ability to
advance its policy goals. For example, a state policy preventing residents
from interconnecting user-provided terminal equipment to the telephone
network in order to place intrastate telephone calls is likely to impair
federal policies allowing the use of such equipment for interstate calls.'
Similarly, a state policy requiring the use of the "whole life" method for
depreciating the "intrastate component" of LECs' central office equipment
in order to keep local telephone rates low is likely to frustrate federal
policies that seek to promote network modernization by requiring the use
of accelerated depreciation for the "interstate component" of that equip-
ment.' And a state policy requiring common carriers to provide jurisdic-
tionally intrastate enhanced services using separate facilities and personnel
is likely to undermine the federal policy promoting the provision of
jurisdictionally interstate basic and enhanced services on an integrated
basis.24
B. The Early FCC Victories (1974-1982)
The opening salvo in the federal-state conflict was fired by North
Carolina.' The issue was whether telephone subscribers should have the
right to attach user-provided CPE to the interstate telephone network, rather
than being required to use equipment provided by the carrier. After years
of litigation, the FCC concluded that subscribers should have this right.26
In 1974, however, the North Carolina Public Utilities Commission (NCUC)
announced its intention to prohibit the attachment of user-provided CPE to
telecommunications service).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 26-33.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 48-51.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 57-66.
25. For a more detailed review of the history of the federal-state dispute, see generally
McKenna, supra note 6, at 20-52 (reviewing cases prior to 1986) and Michael J. Zpevak,
FCC Preemption After Louisiana PSC, 45 FED. CoMM. L.J. 185, 190-205 (1991) (reviewing
cases from 1986 to 1990).
26. See In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv. v. AT&T,
Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, reconsideration denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13
F.C.C.2d 571 (1968); see also Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269
(D.C. Cir. 1956) ("[A subscriber has a right to] use his telephone in ways which are
privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.").
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the telephone network-unless the equipment was to be used exclusively for
interstate calls. The FCC promptly responded, issuing an order preempting
state restrictions on interconnection.27
North Carolina challenged the preemption order in the Fourth Circuit.
The state argued that the FCC had exceeded its authority under Section
2(b)(1) of the Communications Act which, on its face, deprives the FCC
of jurisdiction over carrier-provided intrastate communications services and
facilities.28 If necessary, North Carolina suggested, subscribers could be
required to purchase two pieces of CPE (and two transmission lines) one
for interstate calls, and one for intrastate calls.
The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded. Deferring to the FCC's
findings, the court observed that "[u]sually it is not feasible, as a matter of
economics and practicality of operation, to limit the use of such equipment
to either interstate or intrastate transmission." 9 Therefore, the court
continued, the "practical effect" of the proposed North Carolina regulation
would be to prohibit the attachment of customer-provided CPE to the
interstate network, thereby preventing subscribers from exercising their
federal right of interconnection. 0 The FCC, the court concluded, had the
authority to preempt the state regulations in order to avoid being "frustrated
in the exercise of that plenary jurisdiction over the rendition of interstate
and foreign communication services that the Act has conferred upon it."3
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed these conclusions the following year.32
Shortly thereafter, California tried a different tack. Rather than
challenging the authority of the FCC to enter state "territory" through the
exercise of its preemption power, California simply tried to move the
border. The precipitating event was a 1975 order in which the FCC directed
the pre-divestiture Bell System to allow Southern Pacific Communications
Company (the predecessor of Sprint Communications) to interconnect
certain specialized facilities-which were capable of being used for both
interstate and intrastate communications-to the Bell System's monopoly
local exchange facilities.3 California challenged the order, arguing that the
27. See In re Telerent Leasing Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 45 F.C.C.2d
204 (1974), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787, 791 (4th
Cir.) [hereinafter NCUC I], cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
28. For the statutory language of Section 2(b)(1), see supra text accompanying note 12.
29. NCUC I, 537 F.2d at 791.
30. Id. at 793.
31. Id.
32. See NCUC IH, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977).
33. See In re AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 14 (1975)
[hereinafter AT&T Order]. The specific facilities at issue were foreign exchange lines
(which permit a subscriber to offer callers in a remote city the ability to access the
[Vol. 47
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FCC lacked jurisdiction over the local exchange facilities because they were
physically located within individual states.
In California v. FCC,' the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
rejected this argument. "Even though ... facilities are located entirely
within single states," the court declared, "'the physical location.., is not
determinative of whether they are interstate or intrastate for regulatory
purposes .... [T]he key issue ... is the nature of the communications
which pass through the facilities ... .,' Because the Bell System's local
exchange facilities were used (at least in part) to support interstate calls, the
FCC had the authority to mandate interconnection. In the following years,
this principle was reaffirmed in a number of cases,36 culminating in
National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC II) "
in which the the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated unequivocally
that physically "intrastate facilities and services used to complete even a
single interstate call may become subject to the FCC regulation to the
extent of their interstate use."38
subscriber by dialing a local telephone number) and common control switching arrangement
service (which allows private line network users to dial "off-net" telephone subscribers
through interconnection with the local exchange).
34. California, 567 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010
(1978).
35. Id. at 86 (quoting AT&T Order, supra note 33, paras. 20, 22).
36. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. FCC, 631 F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (2d Cir. 1980)
(interstate access service subject to FCC regulation).
37. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, 746 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter NARUC 1H].
38. Id. at 1498. In NARUC, the D.C. Circuit held that physically intrastate wide area
telephone service (WATS) lines used to complete interstate calls were subject to federal
regulation. Id. at 1501; cf. Southwestern Cable v. FCC, 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (the FCC's
jurisdiction over interstate communications extends to a physically intrastate California cable
television system that picked up out-of-state broadcast signals from a station in Los Angeles
and carried them by cable or microwave to subscribers in San Diego); General Tel. v. FCC,
413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969) (the FCC's interstate
jurisdiction extends to physically intrastate telephone company "channel service" used to
deliver broadcast signals that originate out-of-state).
One case decided during this period, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. General Tel. Co.,
594 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 839 (1979), is sometimes said to have
reached a contrary result. That case concerned jurisdiction over a basic communications
service, Centrex, that General Telephone provided to its customer, McDonnell Douglas,
using facilities entirely within California. Centrex is a network-based service which allows
a multi-line customer to make intra-office calls as if it had a premises-based switch.
In an often-quoted passage, the Ninth Circuit observed that the service provided to
McDonnell Douglas was not subject to FCC jurisdiction merely "because of the capacity
it possesses to be patched into interstate telecommunications nets." Id at 724 n.3. Read in
isolation, this language could be interpreted to mean that physically intrastate equipment is
not subject to FCC jurisdiction even if used in connection with interstate calls. Such a
construction, however, is inconsistent with the dispositive fact in the case: McDonnell
Number 3]
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Emboldened by its early victories, the FCC went on the offensive. The
Commission previously had determined that carriers could not require
subscribers to use carrier-provided CPE.39 In the Second Computer
Inquiry4 ° the FCC took the next step, declaring that the provision of CPE
was not a common carrier service subject to regulation under Title II of the
Communications Act4' and, therefore, that telephone companies would not
Douglas used its Centrex service exclusively for intrastate calls. See id. There was, therefore,
no basis for federal jurisdiction in that case. Had McDonnell Douglas used its Centrex
service in connection with interstate calls, a different case would have been presented: the
service would have been subject to FCC regulation "to the extent of [its] interstate use."
California 11, 4 F.3d 1505, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Ihe service that General Telephone...
provided to McDonnell Douglas ... was solely intrastate."); see NARUC I, 746 F.2d at
1498; see also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting
Furnishing of Customer Premises Equip. by the Bell Operating Tel. Cos. and the Indep. Tel.
Cos., Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 143, para. 123 (1987)) (finding Centrex service to be
jurisdictionally mixed because it usually is used to "support- both interstate and intrastate
communications').
39. See supra text accompanying note 26.
40. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 [hereinafter Computer II Final
Decision], modified by Memorandum and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) [hereinafter
Computer I Reconsideration Order], aff'd and clarified by Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981) [hereinafter Computer 1IFurther
Reconsideration Order], aff'd sub nom. CCIA, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 938 (1983), affd on second further reconsideration, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 301 (1984).
41. See Computer IIFinal Decision, supra note 40, paras. 122-32, 168-73. The question
of when an entity is acting as a common carrier has received considerable attention in the
courts. The Communications Act does not provide a clear definition of the term "common
carrier." See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1988) (defining a common carrier as "any person engaged
as a common carrier for hire'). In NARUC I, however, the D.C. Circuit concluded that an
entity is engaging in common carriage if it "'undertakes to carry for all people indifferent-
ly."' National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir.)
[hereinafter NARUC 1], cert. denied sub. nom. National Ass'n of Radiotelephone Sys. v.
FCC, 425 U.S. 942 (1976) (quoting Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 279 F.2d 737, 739 (5th
Cir. 1960)). In other words, an entity acts as a common carrier when it serves the public on
standardized terms, rather than entering into individualized contracts. See id. An entity's
obligation to serve the public indifferently can arise from either of two sources: a business
decision to "hold itself out" as providing service in this matter or from a government-
imposed obligation to do so. See id. at 643-44.
If an entity provides a service on. a common carrier basis, that service is subject to
regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. Title II imposes a number of
obligations. For example, an interstate common carrier must: (1) provide service on
reasonable request, 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988); (2) charge rates that are just and reasonable,
47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988); (3) not discriminate among customers, 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1988);
(4) file and comply with public tariffs governing the terms and conditions on which it
provides service, 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988); and (5) obtain FCC approval before
constructing new facilities or discontinuing existing services, 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1988).
An entity can act as a common carrier for some purposes but not for others. For
example, a telephone company is acting as a common carrier when it provides interstate
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be allowed to offer CPE as part of their regulated interstate transmission
service.42 Rather, carriers were to offer CPE on a "private contract" basis.
The Commission further determined that imposition of common-carrier-type
regulation by the states would undermine the FCC's policy of promoting
a competitive CPE market. Acting pursuant to its "ancillary authority"
under Title I of the Communications Act,43 the FCC preempted all such
state regulation.'
This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
in Computer & Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC (CCL). 4" As in
the NCUC cases, the court deferred to the FCC's finding that because
"consumers use the same CPE in both interstate and intrastate communica-
tions and generally wish to purchase both interstate and intrastate
transmission services," a state policy requiring tariffing of CPE used for
intrastate calls could not feasibly coexist with the federal policy requiring
the detariffing of CPE. "The conflicting state policy," the court stated,
"would unavoidably affect the federal policy adversely. Therefore, here, as
in NCUC I and H, the state regulatory power must yield to the federal."47
basic transmission service; it is not acting as a common carrier when it provides enhanced
services. See CCLI, 693 F.2d at 210. Non-common carrier services-such as the provision
of CPE, inside wiring, and enhanced services-also can be provided by entities other than
traditional telephone companies. For a discussion of the FCC's jurisdiction over non-carrier-
provided services, see infra part HI.D.
42. Computer H Final Decision, supra note 40, paras. 8-10.
43. The Supreme Court has held that Title I gives the FCC authority to take "all
regulatory actions 'necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission's statutory
responsibilities."' Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700 (1984) (quoting
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979)). This includes the FCC's
responsibility to "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Thus, Title I gives the
FCC "ancillary" interstate jurisdiction over "those activities and forms of communication
that are [not] specifically described by the Act's other provisions." United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1968).
44. See Computer H Further Reconsideration Order, supra note 40, paras. 33-35, 85;
Computer ifReconsideration Order, supra note 40, para. 155. The FCC also preempted all
state regulation of enhanced services. Computer 1 Further Reconsideration Order, supra
note 40, para. 34 ("[The] efficient utilization and full exploitation of the interstate telecom-
munications network would best be achieved if [enhanced] services are free from public
utility-type regulation."). That decision was not challenged on appeal.
45. CCLI, 693 F.2d at 198.
46. Id. at 215.
47. Id. at 216.
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C. The FCC Overreaches (1982-86)
In the years that followed, the Commission launched a broad-based
attack on state authority. Between 1982 and 1986, the FCC preempted state
regulation of telephone company equipment depreciation rates, inside
wiring, and enhanced services.
1. Depreciation
The first wave of the FCC attack came in the area of depreciation.
Between 1980 and 1983, the FCC issued a series of orders designed to
increase the speed with which the cost of regulated telephone company
equipment would be "written off" and new equipment deployed.4"
"Adequate capital recovery," the FCC contended, was necessary to achieve
the goal-specified in Title I of the Communications Act-of "'mak[ing]
available ... a rapid, efficient ... communication service."'" The
Commission therefore required carriers to use a form of accelerated
depreciation to recover the cost of the interstate component of their
regulated plant.5 The FCC also preempted state regulations that required
48. See In re Amendment of Part 31 (Expensing of Station Connections), First Report
and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 818 (1981) [hereinafter Part 31 Order], clarified by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 1094 (1982), petition for reconsideration dismissed, 89
F.C.C.2d 1094 (1982) [hereinafter Part 31 Memorandum Opinion & Order], petition for
reconsideration granted and petition for declaration ruling granted by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 92 F.C.C.2d 864 (1983) [hereinafter Part 31 Further Reconsideration
Order]; In re Amendment of Part 31 of the Commission's Rules (Property Depreciation),
Report and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980), petition for reconsideration denied by Order
on Reconsideration, 87 F.C.C.2d 916 (1981).
49. Part 31 Further Reconsideration Order, supra note 48, par. 33 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1988)).
50. As early as 1930, the Supreme Court recognized that the cost of the local telephone
plant jointly used for interstate and intrastate calls should be allocated between the federal
and state jurisdictions. See Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel., 282 U.S. 133 (1930). To effectuate
this policy, the FCC has adopted regulations that govern the method by which such costs
are allocated.
Because some telephone company plant is used to provide both regulated basic
telephone service and non-regulated service (such as enhanced services), it is first necessary
to allocate costs between the carrier's regulated and non-regulated accounts. This process
is governed by the FCC's Joint Cost Order. See In re Separation of Costs of Regulated
Telephone Service From Costs of Nonregulated Activities, Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
1298, reconsidered, 2 FCC Rcd. 6283 (1987), further reconsideration, 3 FCC Rd. 6701
(1988). Under FCC rules, those costs related to telephone company plant subject to Title
IH regulation are then subject to the jurisdictional separations process. See Letter from
Kenneth P. Moran, Chief, Accounting and Audits Div., to Responsible Accounting Officers,
5 FCC Rcd. 5947 (1990) [hereinafter RAO Letter 16].
The jurisdictional separations process is governed by Part 36 of the Commission's
Rules. See Jurisdictional Separations Procedures, 47 C.F.R. § 36 (1993); see also In re
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use of a different method of depreciating the intrastate component of
regulated telephone company equipment. The FCC reasoned that Section
2(b)(1) did not stand as a bar to exercise of its preemptive authority
because "[s]tate depreciation rate prescriptions that do not adequately
provide for capital recovery in the competitive environment ... would
frustrate the accomplishment of [the FCC's] policy."'"
2. Inside Wiring
The Commission also sought to wrest control of the regulation of
inside wiring from the states. Historically, the provision of inside wiring
had been treated as a regulated common carrier activity. In 1986, however,
the FCC directed that inside wiring be unbundled from the carriers'
transmission service and offered on a non-regulated, private contract
basis.52 As it had done with CPE, the Commission also preempted the
states from regulating inside wiring.53
The FCC stated that Section 2(b)(1) did not prevent it from displacing
state inside wiring regulations. That provision, the FCC observed, deprived
the Commission of jurisdiction over "charges, classifications, practices,
services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service by wire or radio of any carrier."54 Because it had
determined that the provision of inside wiring is not common carriage, the
FCC reasoned, Section 2(b)(1) did not limit its power to preempt state
regulation.55 The FCC further reasoned that-even if Section 2(b)(1) were
applicable-federal preemption was permissible because "a federal program
of competitive, deregulated provision of inside wiring cannot coexist with
a state system providing for regulated carrier provision of inside wiring
Prescription of Procedures for Separating and Allocating Plant Investment, Operating
Expenses, Taxes and Reserves Between the Intrastate and the Interstate Operations of Tel.
Companies, Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.2d 317, para. 40 (1969). The FCC has exclusive
authority to establish the procedure governing this process. See Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 827 F.2d 1264, 1277-78 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
See generally In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 2 FCC Rcd. 5208, paras. 8-12 (1987) (describing the allocation and
separations processes).
51. Part 31 Further Reconsideration Order, supra note 48, para. 31.
52. See Detariffng the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring, Final Rule, 51
Fed. Reg. 8498, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1143 [hereinafter Inside Wiring Detariffing
Order], petition for reconsideration granted by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 FCC
Red. 1190 (1986) [hereinafter Inside Wiring Detariffing Reconsideration Order].
53. Inside Wiring Detariffing Reconsideration Order, supra note 52, para. 13.
54. Id. para. 14.
55. Id. para. 16.
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absent a requirement that consumers obtain two systems of inside
Siring.9"56
3. Enhanced Services
The FCC's most ambitious offensive against state jurisdiction came
in the area of enhanced services. Under rules adopted during the Second
Computer Inquiry, and modified following AT&T divestiture,57 the Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs) were required to provide interstate enhanced
services on a non-regulated basis using corporate affiliates that were
structurally separate from the carriers' basic transmission service opera-
tions. 58 The structural separation requirement was intended to prevent the
BOCs from leveraging their monopoly control over the local exchange to
obtain a competitive advantage in the emerging enhanced services
market.59
The FCC's commitment to structural separation was not long-lived.
In Third Computer Inquiry, the FCC announced that it had concluded that
the cost of structural separation resulting from the reduction of carrier
efficiency outweighed the benefits resulting from the reduced risk of BOC
anticompetitive conduct.60 The FCC therefore replaced structural separa-
56. Id. para. 18.
57. Under the terms of the Modification of Final Judgment, AT&T was required to give
up its local exchange operations. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 141-42
(D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). On
January 1, 1984, the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies assumed control of these
facilities.
58. Under structural separation, AT&T's separate affiliate was required to have separate
facilities, personnel, accounts, and corporate identity from the carrier's basic transmission
service operations. See Computer II Further Reconsideration Order, supra note 40, para.
83 n.34; Computer II Final Decision, supra note 40, para. 191. The FCC issued rules
applying structural separation to the BOCs upon their divestiture. See In re Policy and Rules
Concerning the Furnishing of Customer Premises Equip., Enhanced Servs., and Cellular
Comms. Servs. by the Bell Operating Cos., Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1117 (1983)
[hereinafter BOC Separation Order], aff'd sub nom. Illinois Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC,
740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd denial of petitions for reconsideration, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,056 (1984), 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 581, a fd sub nom. North Am. Tel. Ass'n v. FCC,
772 F.2d 1282 (7th Cir. 1985).
59. There are at least two ways in which the BOCs could do so. First, a BOC could
cross-subsidize its own enhanced service offerings with revenues from its monopoly local
exchange service-thereby allowing it to "under sell" non-affiliated enhanced service
providers (ESPs), who lack access to monopoly revenues necessary for cross-subsidization.
Second, a BOC could discriminate in the provision of local exchange service against non-
carrier-affiliated ESPs, who rely on the BOCs' underlying transport services to deliver their
offerings to end-users. See BOC Separation Order, supra note 58, paras. 25-47.
60. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Third
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, para. 348 (1986) [hereinafter
Computer III Phase I Order], petition for reconsideration denied by Memorandum Opinion
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tion with a regime under which the BOCs may integrate their interstate
basic and enhanced service operations, subject to certain nonstructural safe-
guards."' The nonstructural safeguards included a requirement that the
BOCs disclose to enhanced service providers (ESPs) information necessary
to achieve interconnection with the carriers' basic transmission network (the
network disclosure rule). Such disclosure was to be made at least six
months before a BOC's introduction of an enhanced servicd that uses a
network interface that had not been previously disclosed.62 The non-
structural safeguards also required the BOCs to allow ESPs to have access
to certain information regarding customers' use of the basic transmission
network that could be useful in developing and marketing enhanced
services (the customer proprietary network information (CPNI) rule).6"
Once again, the FCC wielded its preemption sword. The Computer III
Phase I Order preempted all state structural separation requirements and
any state nonstructural safeguards that were in addition to or different from
the federal nonstructural safeguards.' The order also preempted all forms
of state enhanced service tariff regulation.6' The order did not so much as
mention Section 2(b)(1). 66
and Order on Reconsideration, 2 FCC Red. 3035 (1987) [hereinafter Computer I Phase
I Reconsideration Order], reaff'd and clarified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Futher Reconsideration, 3 FCC Rcd. 1135 (1988), reaffid by Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Further Reconsideration and Second Further Reconsideration, 4 FCC Red. 5927
(1989); Computer I Phase I Order and Computer 1I Reconsideration Order vacated sub
nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter California 1]; In re
Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs., Report and Order, 2 FCC
Red. 3072 (1987) [hereinafter Computer HI Phase H Report & Order], affd and clarified
by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 3 FCC Rcd. 1150 (1988)
[hereinafter Computer UIPhase JIReconsideration Order], reaff'd by Memorandum Opinion
and Order on Further Reconsideration and Second Further Reconsideration, 4 FCC Rcd.
5927 (1989) [hereinafter Computer II Phase H Further Reconsideration Order]; Computer
IIPhase HReport & Order vacated sub nom. California I, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
61. See Computer 1f Phase I Order, supra note 60, paras. 345-53.
62. Id. paras. 252-54.
63. Id. paras. 260-62. The Computer 1ff orders also replaced the requirement that AT&T
provide enhanced services on a structurally separate basis with a modified form of
nonstructural safeguards. See Computer I Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra note 60,
paras. 45-53 (discussing the difference between AT&T and the BOCs that justified different
regulatory treatment).
64. Computer Iff Phase I Order, supra note 60, paras. 347-48; Computer II Phase I
Reconsideration Order, supra note 60, paras. 182-90.
65. See Computer 11I Phase I Order, supra note 60, paras. 343-48.
66. The FCC reaffirmed its preemption order in the Computer 1I[ Phase IReconsidera-
tion Order, supra note 60, paras. 198-210, rejecting arguments that it had exceeded its
authority under § 2(b)(1).
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D. The States Counter-Attack (1986-90)
By 1985, the FCC blitzkrieg seemed unstoppable. In a landmark
article on FCC preemption published that year, Bob McKenna observed that
he was "unable to visualize any likely regulatory question or legal issue of
any importance affecting telephone companies" where the FCC could not
exercise preemption power.' All the FCC need do, he concluded, was to
make a "plausible case" that a state rule "substantially affects" the FCC's
exercise of its authority.68
Just one year later, however, the tide began to turn. As a result of a
series of judicial victories between 1986 and 1990, the states were able to
use Section 2(b)(1) to repulse each of the federal incursions into their
territory.
1. Louisiana
The states' first, and perhaps most dramatic, victory came in
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC (Louisiana).6 9 By a 5 to 2
majority, the Supreme Court struck down the FCC's order preempting
states from adopting depreciation methods for the intrastate component of
telephone company equipment that differed from the method that the FCC
prescribed for the interstate component of that equipment. ° Section
2(b)(1) of the Communications Act, the Court declared, "fences off from
FCC reach or regulation intrastate matters."" The FCC did not have the
right to stray across that jurisdictional fence-even if it did so to promote
the Title I goal of "the creation of a rapid and efficient telephone
service."72
The FCC's trespass, the Court went on, was not unavoidable. The
jurisdictional separations process provided a ready means to facilitate the
application of different depreciation methodologies within the interstate and
intrastate jurisdictions.73 Therefore, the Court concluded, the FCC must
allow the states to apply their own depreciation methodology to the
intrastate component of the telephone company plant.
67. McKenna, supra note 6, at 59.
68. Id. at 59, 62.
69. Lousiana, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
70. See id. at 373.
71. Id. at 370.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 375. For a description of the jurisdictional separations process, see supra note
50 and accompanying text
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2. NARUC III
Rallied by their victory in Louisiana, the states went on the offen-
sive.' Their next target was the FCC's decision to preempt all state
regulation of inside wiring. Their efforts met success in 1989, when the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued a decision that has come to be
known as NARUC MII'
The court rejected the FCC's contention that, because it had
determined that the provision of inside wiring did not constitute regulated
common carriage at the interstate level, the Section 2(b)(1) limit on FCC
regulation of common carrier activity at the intrastate level did not apply.
Such "circular" reasoning, the court chided, would give the FCC "un-
checked authority to force state deregulation of any activity it chose to
deregulate at the interstate level."'76 The court further rejected the FCC's
argument that, even under Section 2(b)(1), preemption was permissible
because the interstate and intrastate components of inside wiring are
physically inseparable. As in Louisiana, the court concluded, the FCC
could use the jurisdictional separations process to preserve a sphere for
state regulation. 7
NARUC LI raised considerable concern about the continued validity
of CCLM, which had upheld FCC preemption of all state regulation of CPE.
CPE and inside wiring are conceptually indistinguishable: both facilities are
physically located on a customer's premises and are used in connection
with interstate and intrastate calls. If the FCC could not adopt a generalized
order preempting all state regulation of inside wiring, how could it adopt
74. Soon after Louisiana, the states scored a small, but noteworthy, victory in the FM
Subcarrier Case, California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986). I-istorically, the FCC
had been assumed to have exclusive jurisdiction over all forms of radio-based (as opposed
to wireline) communications. This assumption was based on the words of § 301 of the
Communications Act, which gives the FCC authority to "maintain the control of the United
States over all the channels of radio transmission." 47 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. V 1993). It is
on this basis that the FCC has exercised exclusive authority over the regulation of broadcast
television and radio. See FCC v. Pottsville Brdcst. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940) (noting
that the Communications Act creates a "unified and comprehensive" system of federal
broadcast regulation). In the FM Subcarrier Case, however, the D.C. Circuit held that
§ 2(b)(1) deprived the FCC of jurisdiction over the intrastate radio transmissions that are
used to provide common carrier services, such as radio paging. See California, 798 F.2d at
1518-20.
75. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
[hereinafter NARUC Ill].
76. Id. at 429.
77. Id. at 428.
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such an order regarding CPE? The court's effort to rationalize the disparate
results was unavailing. 8
3. California I
The low point came for the FCC a year later when the Ninth Circuit,
in California v. FCC (California 1)," struck down the FCC's principal
Computer II orders.80 California I was a double defeat for the FCC. The
court first rejected the FCC's decision to replace structural separation with
nonstructural safeguards at the interstate level, 1 finding that the FCC had
failed to demonstrate that nonstructural safeguards were adequate to reduce
the risk of BOC anticompetitive conduct.82 The court then turned to the
FCC's decision to preempt the states from adopting additional or different
regulations at the intrastate level. Following the D.C. Circuit's lead, the
court rejected the FCC's assertion that Section 2(b)(1) did not limit the
Commission's ability to preempt state regulation of enhanced services
because such services were provided on a private contract, rather than a
common carriage, basis.83 The court noted that the restriction on FCC
regulation applied to "intrastate communication service... of any carrier."
The court reasoned:
the plain meaning of the language "of any carrier" is that [Section
2(b)(1)] applies to communications services provided by common
carriers such as AT&T and the BOCs as distinguished from communi-
cations services provided by non-common carriers such as IBM. Thus,
the distinction made by the statute is between providers of communi-
cations services, i.e., between carriers and non-carriers."
Applying Section 2(b)(1), the court went on to strike down the
Computer IfI preemption orders in their entirety."
78. The court reasoned that, in CCIA, the FCC had made an adequate showing that
preemptively detariffing CPE was necessary to advance the FCC's goal of "developing a
free, competitive market in customer telephone equipment." Id. at 431. Here, in contrast,
the court suggested that merely unbundling inside wiring from transmission service would
be sufficient to create "a free and competitive inside wiring market because it would allow
"customers... to forgo the telephone company's charges for inside wiring and to seek an
alternative provider." Id. at 430. However, the court did not attempt to explain why, if
unbundling was adequate to promote competition in the inside wiring market, it was
inadequate to create competition in the CPE market.
79. California 1, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
81. The challenge to the decision to lift structural separation was brought by the MCI
Telecommunications Company, the nation's second largest interexchange service provider.
82. California I, 905 F.2d at 1230-39.
83. See id. at 1240.
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 1243.
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4. The Casualty Count
In a few short years, the FCC's jurisdictional gains had seemingly
evaporated. In a thought-provoking article written in the early 1990s,
Michael Zpevak concluded that the FCC's preemption powers had been
"whittled down to their statutory base" and, perhaps, even "emasculat-
ed." 6 Indeed, Zpevak suggested, it was "unclear... how the FCC will
continue to set national policy ... while not intruding on state terri-
tory. 8
7
Rumors of the demise of the FCC's preemption authority were
premature. To be sure, Louisiana, NARUC 1I, and California I were
stunning blows to the FCC's once-invincible preemption wehrmacht. Yet,
none of these was an unmitigated loss.
Despite the sweeping language in Louisiana, the actual holding was
carefully limited to the specific situation before the Supreme Court. The
jurisdictional separations process, the Court held, made it possible for
disparate federal and state depreciation policies to coexist.88 The FCC
might not be able to allow carriers to recover costs as quickly as it wished,
but it could require application of its chosen depreciation methodology to
the interstate component of the carriers' equipment. 9 Preemption,
therefore, was impermissible.
At the same time, the Court recognized that the separations process
did not resolve all jurisdictional conflicts. Where it is "not possible to
separate the intrastate and interstate components of asserted federal
regulation" and where "state regulation would negate" FCC regulations, the
Court observed, FCC preemption is permissible." In formulating this so-
called "impossibility" exception to Section 2(b)(1), the Court cited with
approval the Fourth Circuit's decisions in the NCUC cases.9
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit's opinion in NARUC IIL had some
encouraging words for the beleaguered Commission. Relying on Louisiana
86. Zpevak, supra note 25, at 186.
87. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Pierce, Panic at the Helm, NETWORK WORLD,
July 23, 1990, at 26 (stating that the California I decision had "devastated" the FCC and
"set the telecommunications and information industry on a course for catastrophe"). Some
observers were more sanguine. See, e.g., J. Roger Wollenberg, Roger M. Witten, & Jonathan
Jacob Nadler, California v. FCC: After the Earthquake, Life Goes On, COMPUTER LAW.,
Aug. 1990, at 25 (concluding that, while California I was a serious "jolt," there was "no
reason to conclude that the Commission's preemption power ha[d] been reduced to rubble").
88. Lousiana, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
89. Id. at 376.
90. Id. at 375 n.4 (emphasis in original).
91. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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and the NCUC cases, the court observed that "there are circumstances
where state authority must yield to national imperatives."' Thus, the court
went on, the FCC could preempt state regulations that would "negate[] the
exercise by the FCC of its own lawful authority over interstate communica-
tions."'  However, the court added, the FCC "has the burden ... of
showing with some specificity" that a particular state regulation would
"necessarily thwart or impede" federal policy.94 The FCC had simply
failed to meet its burden necessary to preempt exercise of "any regulatory
authority" by the states over inside wiring."
The court's observations regarding tariffing of inside wiring were
particularly interesting. The court recognized that a state that set the tariffed
rates for the intrastate component of carrier-provided inside wiring below
cost would "interfere with the Commission's achievement of its valid goal
of providing interstate telephone users with the benefits of a free market
... [in] inside wiring" because this would "allow telephone companies to
undercut alternative providers," who lacked the ability to cross-subsidize
inside wiring with revenues from monopoly local exchange service.96 The
FCC, the court indicated, could lawfully preempt such tariffs.97
Even California I provided the FCC with some basis for optimism.
Following the D.C. Circuit's lead, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that-notwithstanding Section 2(b)(1)-the FCC has the authority to
preempt state regulation of carrier-provided enhanced services that would
"thwart or impede valid FCC regulatory goals."98 For example, the court
observed, "a state-imposed requirement that carriers use separate physical
facilities for all basic telephone and enhanced services offered on an
intrastate basis would almost certainly force carriers to separate their
interstate services as well."99 Because this would "frustrate" the FCC's
efforts to promote the integration of interstate basic and enhanced services,
the FCC could preempt such regulations. °"
At the same time, the court observed that some forms of state-
imposed enhanced service regulation plainly would not "negate" federal
92. NARUC III, 880 F.2d 422, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 430.
95. Id. (emphasis in original). For example, the court noted, the states had argued that
state-mandated provider-of-last-resort regulations "would not lead to the fiustration of a free
and competitive market." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. California I, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990).




policy. The court's example, however, was a narrow one. State imposition
of structural separation requirements on carrier-provided enhanced services
(such as telephone-based alarm services) offered on an exclusively intrastate
basis, the court stated, would not prevent carriers from offering other
interstate enhanced services on an integrated basis."°1 Once again, the
FCC simply had failed to demonstrate why it was necessary to preempt "all
state regulation" in order to achieve its goals."°
5. Scattered Federal Victories
Even during this period, the FCC won three significant skirmishes
outright. In each case, the D.C. Circuit held that state regulations had to
give way to allow the application of the FCC's rules to interstate service.
In Illinois Bell,"°3 the D.C. Circuit considered the FCC's preemption
of state regulations that were inconsistent with the Commission's require-
ment that the BOCs allow noncarrier CPE vendors to obtain commissions
for marketing Centrex, a BOC-provided basic service used in connection
with both interstate and intrastate calls. The court held that there was no
practical way to apply different federal and state sales commission rules
depending on whether the Centrex service was to be used in connection
with interstate or intrastate calls. Federal preemption of state rules that were
inconsistent with the federal regulatory regime was, therefore, permissi-
ble.'"
The FCC also won a small, but significant, victory in Public Utility
Commission of Texas v. FCC (ARCO).'°5 ARCO concerned an order by
the Texas Public Utilities Commission that barred Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company from providing one of its customers, Atlantic
Richfield Company (ARCO), with additional telephone lines at ARCO's
Dallas headquarters. Texas was concerned that ARCO was undermining the
state's system of exclusive telephone franchises by transporting calls, via
a private microwave system, from its research facility in Plano, Texas
(which was served by a different LEC) and delivering them, via South-
western's lines, to the public-switched telephone network in Dallas. The
FCC preempted the Texas order, reasoning that it was inconsistent with the
101. Id.
102. Id. (emphasis in original).
103. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 115. The court went so far as to suggest that "[e]ven if Centrex were a purely
intrastate service, the FCC might well have authority to preemptively regulate its marketing
if-as would appear here--it was typically sold in a package with interstate services.
Marketing realities might themselves create inseparability." Id. at 113 n.7.
105. Public Util. Comm'n of Texas, 886 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) [hereinafter ARCO].
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FCC's policy of allowing customers to interconnect with the public-
switched telephone network for the purposes of making interstate calls.' 6
As in the NCUC cases, it would have been possible for the FCC to
have required Southwestern to provide ARCO with two sets of facili-
ties-lines to be used for intrastate calls and lines to be used for interstate
calls-and to allow ARCO to interconnect its microwave system only with
the interstate lines, thereby allowing federal interconnection and state
franchise regulations to coexist. However, the court upheld the FCC's
finding that such a requirement would be "'impractical and inefficient"' and
that federal preemption was therefore permissible. °
A third D.C. Circuit preemption case, Public Service Commission of
Maryland v. FCC (Maryland PSC), again upheld an FCC preemption
order."' 8 In that case, the D.C. Circuit affirmed an FCC order preempting
states from setting the rates that LECs charged long distance carriers for
cutting off service to customers that did not pay their long distance
bills."09 Once again, the court was confronted with the argument that it
was possible for separate federal and state regulations to coexist because "it
may be possible technologically to cut off interstate access independently
of local service." 10 And, once again, the court deferred to the FCC,
noting that "[a]t the time it issued [its order], the FCC believed that such
a separation was not practical."1..
E. The FCC Retreats (1991)
Although the losses in Louisiana, NARUC HI, and California I may
not have been as dramatic as they initially appeared, they left the FCC
badly bruised. In response, the Commission initiated a strategic retreat on
all fronts.
The FCC recognized immediately that the "depreciation battle" was
a lost cause; the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana had made clear that
the states had an incontrovertible right to control the rates at which the
intrastate component of common carrier plant was written off. The
106. See In re Atlantic Richfield Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd.
3089 (1988) [hereinafter ARCO Order].
107. ARCO, 886 F.2d at 1333 (quoting ARCO Order, supra note 106, para. 17).
108. Public Sen,. Comm'n of Maryland, 909 F.2d 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Maryland PSC].
109. The service, called Disconnect-Non-Payment (DNP) is a service sold by LECs to
interexchange carriers in which the LEC .cuts off both interstate and intrastate telephone
service when the customer fails to pay its long distance bill.




Commission responded by promptly evacuating from that region."' In the
ensuing years, it has not attempted to venture across the jurisdictional
border on this issue.
In contrast, the NARUC III and .California I decisions left the
Commission with a fair amount of maneuvering room in the inside wiring
and enhanced services areas. Two orders, both adopted on November 21,
1991, signalled that the Commission intended to pull back to more
defensible lines."'
1. Inside Wiring
The more comprehensive FCC pull-back came on the inside wiring
front. The FCC returned most of the intrastate regulatory territory it had
occupied, leaving only a "strategic outpost" and a "reconnaissance team."
The outpost was an order preempting the states from requiring carriers
to bundle inside wiring with charges for tariffed transmission service." 4
There was no question the FCC could defend this limited incursion; the
D.C. Circuit had expressly authorized it in the NARUC III opinion."' The
reconnaissance operation was the Commission's idea. It announced that it
would "monitor the states's actions" and "revisit the area in the event that
information gained from monitoring and other sources showed that state
actions were impeding federal policies or injuring consumers."1 6 Again
taking its cue from the D.C. Circuit,"' the FCC expressly stated that it
was not preempting state regulations requiring LECs to function as inside
wiring "providers of last resort."'1.
112. See In re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
FCC Red. 6069, para. 1 (1987) ("Louisiana held that this Commission does not have
preemptive authority over state-imposed depreciation schedules that are used for purposes
of computing interstate rates.").
113. See Detariffing the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring, Third Report and
Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 1334 (1992) [hereinafter Inside Wiring Remand Order]; In re Computer
I Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exch. Co.
Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 7571 (1991) [hereinafter Computer HI Remand
Order], vacated in part and remanded sub nom. California HI, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994),
petition for cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2435 (Apr. 3, 1995).
114. See Inside Wiring Remand Order, supra note 113, para. 1.
115. NARUC I, 880 F.2d 422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Commission may require
that all [states] unbundle inside wiring from basic telephone service.').
116. Inside Wiring Remand Order, supra note 113, para. 9. To facilitate its monitoring,
the FCC directed telephone companies with annual revenues of $100 million or more to
notify it of any proposed state efforts to regulate the price of carrier-provided inside wiring.
See id. para. 22.
117. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
118. Inside Wiring Remand Order, supra note 113, para. 27. This order was not
challenged on appeal.
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2. Enhanced Services
The FCC's retreat in the enhanced services area was somewhat more
limited, although still quite significant.
In Computer LI Remand Order,"9 the FCC reaffirmed its deci-
sion-made in the original Computer HI orders-to lift the requirement that
the BOCs provide interstate enhanced services pursuant to structural separa-
tion.12 In its place, the FCC imposed nonstructural safeguards that it
claimed were stronger than the ones found inadequate in California L"'
For example, the FCC required the BOCs to obtain prior consent from
customers with more than twenty lines before using customer proprietary
network information to develop or market enhanced services."z The
Commission also reaffirmed the network information disclosure rule.
Turning to the preemption question, the FCC began by extending the
olive branch to the states. "It is inevitable," the FCC observed, that:
state commissions will have different experiences and perspectives that
may lead them to adopt safeguards that are at variance with each other,
and with federal safeguards. These differences should be accommodat-
ed wherever possible. Preemption of state regulation in this area should
be as narrow as possible to accommodate differing state views while
preserving federal goals."n
119. Computer III Remand Order, supra note 113.
120. No party in the California I case challenged the FCC's decision to lift structural
separation requirements as applied to AT&T. However, the California I decision had the
effect of vacating that aspect of Computer I. In a separate order, the FCC readopted its
decision to lift the AT&T structural separation requirement. See In re Computer HI Remand
Proceedings, Report and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 7719 (1990). No party challenged that
determination.
121. See Computer IL Remand Order, supra note 113, paras. 12-89.
122. The FCC concluded that its new rule would balance its concern about preventing
the BOCs from having an unfair competitive advantage in the enhanced services market
through their access to CPNI with its desire to allow carriers to provide interstate basic and
enhanced services on an integrated basis. A more stringent prior authorization requirement
(such as one requiring the BOCs to obtain prior authorization from all customers), the FCC
reasoned, would prevent the joint marketing of basic and enhanced services to most
customers. See id. para. 85. In effect, the FCC's theory was that a BOC would be unable
to obtain authorization from all of its customers. As a result, the carrier would be obligated
to use separate marketing personnel for basic and enhanced services in order to ensure that
enhanced services marketing personnel did not make impermissible use of CPNI. Limiting
the prior authorization requirement to multi-line customers, in contrast, would make it
possible for a BOC to obtain the necessary consents (or employ appropriate "blocking"
technology) so that it would be possible for it to use the same marketing personnel for basic
and enhanced services.
123. Id. para. 121.
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The order that followed demonstrated that the FCC had traded its
preemption sword for a finely honed stiletto. Only three forms of state
enhanced service regulation were preempted: regulations requiring
carriers124 to offer the intrastate portion of jurisdictionally mixed en-
hanced services using personnel or facilities different from those used with
basic telephone service; ' 5 regulations requiring carrier personnel responsi-
ble for marketing enhanced services to obtain customer consent prior to
accessing CPNI in circumstances in which FCC regulations allow access
without prior customer approval;"26 and regulations requiring carriers to
disclose network information to competing ESPs at a time prior to that
required by FCC rules.'27
In a marked departure from past practice, the FCC carefully justified
each element of its preemption order. The Commission began with its
preemption of certain state structural separation regulations. In theory, the
FCC conceded, a carrier could use separate personnel and facilities to
provide intrastate basic and enhanced services while combining its interstate
basic and enhanced services in a single entity.128 However, the FCC
recognized that "[a]s a practical matter" such an arrangement would impose
significant inefficiencies.'29 The result, the FCC stated, would be that
"state structural separation requirements [applicable to personnel and
facilities used to provide intrastate enhanced services] will compel carriers
to use structural separation for interstate services and, therefore, will negate
the federal policy for interstate enhanced services."' 30
The FCC then turned to its preemption of certain state nonstructural
safeguards. The FCC justified its decision to bar states from imposing more
stringent prior customer authorization requirements before carrier personnel
could obtain CPNI as necessary to allow carriers to provide basic and
enhanced services on an integrated basis. Allowing a state to impose more
stringent requirements, the Commission reasoned, would "effectively
require the separation of marketing and sales personnel dealing with
interstate enhanced services from personnel dealing with interstate basic
services."''
124. The preemption order was applicable to state regulation of the BOCs, AT&T, and
the independent telephone companies.
125. Computer lI Remand Order, supra note 113, paras. 122-29.
126. Id. para. 130.
127. Id. para. 131.
128. See id. para. 124.
129. Id. para. 127.
130. Id.
131. Id. para. 130.
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Finally, the FCC concluded that it was justified in preempting state
regulations that required disclosure of network information at a time prior
to that provided by the FCC rules. "[I]nitial disclosure [of network
information]," it stated, "can occur only once. ... [A] state rule that
required initial disclosure at a time that differs from the time specified in
the federal rule would negate the federal timing ...."132
The FCC went on to expressly describe the limits of its incursion into
state territory. According to the Commission, the states were free to adopt
structural separation requirements in connection with any purely intrastate
(as opposed to jurisdictionally mixed) carrier-provided enhanced ser-
vice. 133 The states also could adopt structural separation requirements
(other than those expressly preempted) applicable to jurisdictionally mixed
enhanced services.13 Finally, the states were free to impose any non-
structural safeguard not expressly barred by the order. 3 The FCC
declined to even consider preempting states from imposing entry, exit, and
tariff regulation on carrier-provided intrastate enhanced services."'
F. The States Overreach (1991-94)
While the states had won some significant battles in the late 1980s,
they were not in as strong a position as they thought. Their overconfidence
led to some serious miscalculations. Following the California I decision,
the states launched a two-prong attack on the FCC's powers. First, the
states again attempted to redefine the boundary between federal and state
authority by trying to carve out an "intrastate segment" of services that
previously were viewed as jurisdictionally interstate. Second, the states tried
to erect new barriers to federal preemption of those services that were
within the intrastate jurisdiction. Just as the courts turned back the FCC's
overreaching, they now rejected the extravagant claims the states advanced.
1. Jurisdictional Challenges
The first prong of the states' attack was to reopen the debate-seem-
ingly resolved in NARUC / 137 -over the ability of the FCC to regulate
132. Id. para. 131.
133. Id. para. 122.
134. Id. For example, a state could require that carriers provide intrastate enhanced
services through separate legal entities or use separate accounting rules from those used for
basic services.
135. Id. para. 121.
136. Id. para. 111 n.214.
137. NARUC I1, 746 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes 33-
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the physically intrastate segment of an interstate communication. Most of
this effort centered on the rapidly emerging enhanced service market. For
example, Florida announced that it would assert jurisdiction over communi-
cations between an ESP's customer located in Florida and the ESP's "point
of presence" elsewhere in the state. The fact that the communication might
terminate at a database located in another state, Florida concluded, "is not
relevant. 13' A number of states also declared that their jurisdiction
extended to enhanced services sessions that originate and terminate within
their state, even if information passes through other jurisdictions over
federally tariffed interstate lines. 139 California took a different approach,
announcing that it would require carriers to allocate 100 percent of the cost
of enhanced services to the intrastate jurisdiction, thereby allowing the state
to exercise regulatory authority over all carrier-provided enhanced services
offered within the state. 4'
The most controversial state decision during this period concerned
MemoryCall, an enhanced service offered by BellSouth that stores
incoming voice messages for subsequent retrieval by the subscriber. An
investigation by the Georgia PSC concluded that BellSouth had engaged in
a variety of anticompetitive activities in connection with its offering of this
138. An Investigation Into Statewide Offering of Access to the Local Network for the
Purpose of Providing Information Service, Docket 880 423-TP, Order No. 21815, at 12-19,
23 (Fla. P.S.C. Sept. 5, 1989).
139. See D.C. PSC Order to Show Cause at 2-3; see also IDAHO CODE § 61-121(2)
(1994) (defining "telecommunication service" as "the transmission of two-way interactive
switched signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or other information of any
nature by wire, radio, llghtwaves, or other electromagnetic means... which originate and
terminate in this state"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-9A-3(L) (Michie 1989 Repl.) (defining
"public telecommunications service" as "the transmission of signs, signals, writings, sounds,
messages, data or other information of any nature by wire, radio, lightwaves or other
electromagnetic means originating and terminating in this state regardless of actual call
routing"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4927.01(D) (Anderson 1991); New England Tel. & Tel.,
Docket No. 87-290, at 3 (Maine P.U.C. Apr. 25, 1988) (advisory opinion) ("[Telephone
calls which both originate and terminate within a single state, regardless of the route over
which they are transported, are intrastate calls." (emphasis in the original)); Responsive
Comments of the Staff of the Public Service Commission of the District of Columbia,
Formal Case No. 904, at 4 (Jan. 24, 1991) (arguing that the D.C. PSC's jurisdiction
"include[s] calls to enhanced service providers which originate and terminate in the District
of Columbia even though the call may exit the District of Columbia during its transmis-
sion").
140. See Application of California for Petition for Review of RAO Letter 16 at 3 (Nov.
16, 1990). California adopted the same approach in connection with carrier-provided inside
wiring. See Classification of Inside Wiring Servs. for Accounting Purposes, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Rcd. 3521 (1990) [hereinafter RAO Letter 14]; Letter from
Kenneth P. Morgan, Chief, Accounting and Audits Div., to Responsible Accounting
Officers, 4 FCC Rcd. 7110 (1989).
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service.14 1 Seeking to curb these abuses, Georgia issued an order in which
it declared that, because the enhanced function (information storage and
retrieval) was performed by facilities that were physically present in
Georgia, MemoryCall was a purely intrastate service within the Georgia
PSC's jurisdiction.'42 Exercising its supposed exclusive authority, Georgia
barred BellSouth from providing MemoryCall to new customers for an
indefinite period.
At BellSouth's request, the FCC issued a declaratory ruling preempt-
ing Georgia's action. The FCC first found that-because MemoryCall can
be used to store voice messages that originate both inside and outside of
Georgia-it was a jurisdictionally mixed (rather than purely intrastate)
service'" and that the interstate component was within the FCC's plenary
interstate jurisdiction.'45 The FCC went on to find that, as a practical
matter, Georgia's ban on the use of MemoryCall in connection with
intrastate calls would have the effect of preventing subscribers from using
the service in connection with interstate calls. This, the FCC concluded,
was irreconcilable with its regulation allowing BellSouth to offer Memory-
Call to interstate subscribers.'46
Georgia appealed the FCC's order, again arguing that MemoryCall
was a "purely intrastate" service and that the FCC had no authority to
preempt state regulation. The Eleventh Circuit disposed of the state's claims
in a single sentence: "The record fully supports both the jurisdictional
aspect and the reasonableness of the order entered by the Federal
Communications Commission."'147
The states did not limit their jurisdictional attacks to enhanced
services. As part of its Computer IfI orders, the FCC had required the
141. Investigation into Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company's Provisions
of MemoryCall Service, Docket No. 4000-U, at 26-42 (Georgia P.S.C. May 21, 1991)
[hereinafter Georgia MemoryCall Order].
142. Id. at 56. Georgia recognized that MemoryCall could be used to store messages that
originated out of state. However, it reasoned that the use of MemoryCall in connection with
out-of-state calls constituted two separate "communications": a jurisdictionally interstate
basic telephone call from an out-of-state caller to the telephone company switch in Georgia,
and a subsequent jurisdictionally intrastate enhanced service in which information was
routed from the carrier's switch to the carrier's message storage facility. See Petition for
Emergency Relief and Declaratory Ruling Filed by the BellSouth Corp., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Red. 1619 (1992) (describing Georgia's position) [hereinafter
MemoryCall Preemption Order].
143. Georgia MemoryCall Order, supra note 141, at 71-72.
144. MemoryCall Preemption Order, supra note 142, paras. 6, 12.
145. Id.
146. Id. para. 20.




BOCs to implement a system of Open Network Architecture (ONA). Under
ONA, the carriers were required to "unbundle" their basic communications
networks and allow ESPs to obtain the individual "building blocks" needed
to provide enhanced services.14 In its subsequent ONA Order, the FCC
adopted a "common ONA model," which divided the network "building
blocks" into two principal categories: Basic Serving Arrangements (BSAs)
and Basic Service Elements (BSEs).149 BSAs are physically intrastate
transmission links that can be used to provide access to the interstate
communications network.-BSEs are other network "features and functions,"
such as calling number identification and call routing, that ESPs may find
useful in providing service. 5 °
Because ONA services are used to provide enhanced services on both
an interstate and intrastate basis, the ONA Order addressed the question of
how responsibility for regulating these services should be divided between
the Commission and the states. Several states argued that BSEs are subject
to exclusive state jurisdiction because they are provided using software that
is resident in physically intrastate telephone company switches.' The
FCC rejected these arguments, finding that BSEs used to provide enhanced
services that cross state lines are jurisdictionally interstate. It therefore
determined that BSEs should be "subject to regulation... on both the state
and federal levels."'' The FCC subsequently approved the ONA plans
submitted by the BOCs.153
California (joined by several other states) appealed the FCC's decision
to require joint tariffing of BSEs.' The states renewed their argument
that BSEs were subject to exclusive state regulation. The states further
argued that, even if BSEs were jurisdictionally mixed, the FCC was
148. See Computer II Phase I Order, supra note 60, paras. 206-17. The Commission
elaborated on this requirement in the Computer IL Phase I Reconsideration Order, supra
note 60, paras. 106-12.
149. In re Filing and Review of the Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 4 FCC Red. 1, para. 56 (1988) [hereinafter ONA Order], on
reconsideration, 5 FCC Red. 3079 (1990) [hereinafter ONA Reconsideration Order].
150. ONA Order, supra note 149, para. 57. The ONA Order also identified a third
category of network "building blocks," Complementary Network Services (CNSs), which
are state-tariffed basic services (such as "call waiting" or "distinctive ring") that end-users
employ to access the telephone network in connection with both basic and enhanced
services.
151. See id. para. 252 n.521.
152. Id. para. 224; ONA Reconsideration Order, supra note 149, para. 35.
153. See In re Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Phase I,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 5 FCC Red. 3103 (1990) [hereinafter BOC ONA Plan
Amendment Order].
154. See Brief For Petitioner-Intervenors at 17-18, California H, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir.
1993).
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obligated to "adopt a federal tariffing requirement [for interstate BSEs] that
was narrowly crafted" to avoid interfering with state policies-especially
some states' efforts to require the BOCs to price ONA services above cost
in order to create a subsidy for other services.'55
This time it took the court an entire paragraph to dispose of the states'
jurisdictional arguments. In California H, the Ninth Circuit held that:
[The ONA orders] clearly establish a dual federal and state tariffing
structure for BSEs, and the states will retain authority to set rates for
those BSEs that are used for intrastate service. This system complies
with the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana that the Communica-
tions Act is designed to establish a dual regulatory scheme. Essentially,
the state is seeking to preempt FCC regulations of communications,
and this violates the Act just as FCC preemption of state regulation did
in Louisiana and California L.156
The states' effort to "shift the boundary" between the interstate and
intrastate jurisdictions had been no more successful in the early 1990s than
it had been a decade earlier.
2. Preemption Challenges
The states' final assault started, where the war had begun, with
Section 2(b)(1). In the Computer III Remand Order, the FCC had
significantly scaled back its earlier enhanced service preemption order.
Nonetheless, the FCC-relying on its Title I power-had again preempted
certain state structural and nonstructural separation requirements applicable
to intrastate enhanced services. 157 The states again appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, arguing that the FCC had still gone too far.
The states made two principal thrusts at the FCC's jurisdiction. The
first was to assert that the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana
"unequivocally rejected" the claim that the FCC could use its preemption
power to advance Title I goals. The second was to contend that, even when
acting under Title II, the FCC could only preempt state regulation where
simultaneous compliance with divergent federal and state rules was a
"literal impossibility." In a consolidated case, MCI claimed that the FCC's
new structural separation requirements remained inadequate to prevent BOC
cross-subsidization and discrimination at the interstate level.
In California III, the Ninth Circuit found for MCI, again rejecting the
FCC's decision to replace BOC structural separation with nonstructural
155. Id. at 21.
156. California 11, 4 F.3d at 1515.




safeguards at the interstate level. 5 ' Turning to the preemption issue, the
court first addressed the question whether the FCC can preempt under its
Title I authority.' Again, a paragraph was all that was necessary to
dispose of the states' claim. Louisiana, the court recognized, had held that
Section 2(b)(1) limited the FCC's authority under both Title I and Title
H.6 ° Although the preemption order rejected in Louisiana was based on
the FCC's Title I power, the Ninth Circuit made clear that-if it could
make the proper showing-the FCC could justify preemption under that
Title.'6'
The court then turned to the question of what the proper showing
would be. To resolve this issue, it went back to the NCUC cases. In those
cases, FCC preemption had been permissible because compliance with
conflicting federal and state regulations governing interconnection, while
possible, was highly unlikely due to practical and economic considerations.
The present case, the court concluded, was "similar."' 62 While BOC
compliance with conflicting federal and state rules governing the use of
separate facilities or personnel and access to CPNI was literally possible,
the FCC had demonstrated that "as in the NCUC cases.., it would not be
economically or operationally feasible for them to do so.""I63 The FCC,
therefore, had met its obligation of "demonstrating that [its] order is
158. See California HI, 39 F.3d 919, 923-31 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S.
LEXIS 2435 (Apr. 3, 1995). The court relied on the findings of the Georgia PSC regarding
BellSouth's abuses in providing MemoryCall service as well as its prior decision in
California II which had concluded that-in the years following Computer llI-the FCC had
significantly "diluted" the effectiveness of its ONA program in reducing the ability of the
BOCs to discriminate against non-carrier ESPs. California , 4 F.3d at 1511-13. The FCC
subsequently initiated a new proceeding to again revisit the adequacy of nonstructural
safeguards in preventing BOC anticompetitive abuse. See In re Computer III Further
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Provision of Enhanced Services, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Dkt. No. 95-20, FCC 95-48 (Feb. 21, 1995).
159. The court failed to explain why, after rejecting the FCC's decision to replace the
BOC structural separation requirement with nonstructural safeguards at the interstate level,
it was necessary to consider the authority of the FCC to prevent states from adopting certain
requirements that were inconsistent with the invalidated federal regulatory scheme. The
answer, presumably, is that the FCC's preemption order was not limited to state regulation
of the BOCs; it also applied to state regulation of enhanced services provided by AT&T and
the independent telephone companies, which are not subject to federal structural separation
requirements.
160. California IHf, 39 F.3d at 932-33.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court also affirmed the FCC's conclusion that it would be literally
impossible for separate federal and state disclosure dates for network information to co-
exist. Id. at 933.
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narrowly tailored to preempt only such state regulation as would negate
valid regulatory goals." 1" The battle had come full circle.
II. FOUR PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
The FCC and the states are at a crossroads. After more than a dozen
engagements, it has become clear that neither side can conquer the other.
The prudent course of action is for both sides to take stock of their
experience and try to agree to a set of principles that will allow them to
turn their litigators' swords into regulatory pruning hooks. The cases
outlined above suggest the basis for such a peace treaty. It is not a peace
based on shared values; it is one based on respect for each other's
authority. The principles of the proposed peace treaty are as follows:
o Jurisdiction is determined on an end-to-end basis. Any communication
that crosses state lines between its point of origin and its point of
termination is jurisdictionally interstate. Physically intrastate facilities
and services used in connection with interstate communications are
jurisdictionally interstate to the extent of their interstate use.
" The FCC has plenary jurisdiction over interstate communications
facilities and services. The states may not regulate such facilities and
services directly or by reclassifying interstate facilities and services as
intrastate.
o The states are entitled, in the first instance, to regulate intrastate
communications facilities and services. In so doing, they may adopt
common carrier policies that differ from those adopted by the FCC.
" The FCC may preempt state regulations applicable to carrier-provided
intrastate communications facilities or services to the extent that the
Commission concludes, as a practical matter, that enforcement of such
regulations would prevent the application of federal regulations to
interstate carrier-provided communications services or facilities.
Each of these principles is discussed below.
164. Id. (quoting California I, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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A. Jurisdiction is Determined on an End-to-End Basis
Peace is not possible if the FCC and the states cannot agree on where
the border between their jurisdictions lies. Fortunately, the Communications
Act provides clear guidance in resolving this question.
The Act defines a "wire communication" as "the transmission of
writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds ... between the
points of origin and reception."'165 The Act further provides that when
such a transmission goes "from any State ... to any other State," it is
deemed an interstate communication. 166 Taken together, these provisions
require that jurisdictional determinations be made on an end-to-end basis.
Any communication by wire or radio that crosses state lines at any point
between its "origin and reception" is jurisdictionally interstate.' 67 Similar-
ly, any communication by wire or radio that does not cross state lines
between its point of origin and its point of termination is jurisdictionally
intrastate.
The Communications Act further provides that the interstate
jurisdiction embraces "facilities and services... incidental to transmission"
of an interstate communication. 68 Thus, any facility or service used in
connection with an interstate communication is jurisdictionally interstate to
the extent of its interstate use. The fact that such facilities and services may
be physically intrastate is irrelevant.169 Any facility or service used in
165. 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988).
166. 47 U.S.C. § 153(e) (1988).
167. This recognition pre-dates the adoption of the Communications Act. The seminal
case is Western Union v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920). Speight was a state common law
action arising out of a mistake made by Western Union in the delivery of a telegram from
Greenville, North Carolina to Rosemary, North Carolina. Western Union defended on the
grounds that, because the telegram had been sent by way of Richmond, Virginia, the
plaintiffs claim was governed by federal-rather than state-law. The Supreme Court
agreed, observing that "[t]he transmission of a message through two states is interstate
commerce as a matter of fact" Id. at 18; cf. United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276
(N.D. W. Va. 1962) (noting that a telephone call placed by a bookmaker from Arroyo, West
Virginia to Wheeling, West Virginia, which was routed through Liverpool, Ohio, violated
§ 1084 of the Federal Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (Supp. m1 1959-61) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1988)), which makes it unlawful to "us[e] a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate ... commerce of... information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers").
168. 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988).
169. The Congress that adopted the Communications Act was well aware of this result.
As originally drafted, the bills that were to become the Communications Act of 1934 (S.
1290 and H.R. 8301) contained language that deprived the FCC of jurisdiction to approve
the construction of communications facilities "within a single state." This provision was
strongly opposed by ICC Commissioner McMannamy. In testimony before both the Senate
and House committees in 1934, Commissioner McMannamy explained that physically
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connection with an intrastate communication is jurisdictionally intrastate to
the extent of its intrastate use.'
The federal courts initially considered the division of authority
between the federal and state jurisdictions in connection with basic
telephone service.1 71 However, the same principles are applicable to
enhanced services. Thus, in Georgia PSC, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
FCC's finding that BellSouth's voice messaging service was subject to FCC
jurisdiction to the extent that it was used to store messages that originated
out-of-state.1 72 Conversely, as the Ninth Circuit found in California I,
voice mail, burglar alarm monitoring services, and remote educational
databases that are provided solely to "discrete locales within a state" are
subject to exclusive state jurisdiction. 73
B. The FCC Has Plenary Jurisdiction over Interstate
Communications Facilities and Services
Once the dividing line between federal and state jurisdiction is
established, the next step in the peace process is to determine the authority
of each party within its respective realm. In the case of the federal
sovereign, the answer is straightforward: the FCC has plenary authority
over jurisdictionally interstate communications.
In Louisiana, the Supreme Court observed that, under the Supremacy
Clause, 74 a federal agency has the exclusive right to adopt regulations in
any area in which "Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus
occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States
to supplement federal law.""17 In such cases, state regulations are invalid
intrastate facilities could be used for both jurisdictional interstate and intrastate calls. At his
insistence, Congress adopted the language now found in § 214(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 214(a) (1988), which provides that the FCC lacks jurisdiction over "a [telephone] line
within a single State unless that line constitutes part of an interstate line." See McKenna,
supra note 6, at 15 n.37.
170. Section 221(b) of the Communications Act further authorizes the states to regulate
a single local exchange that straddles the border of two states. 47 U.S.C. § 221(b) (Supp.
V 1993).
171. See, e.g., California II, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) (subjecting BSEs, which are
physically resident in local switches, to FCC jurisdiction to the extent used in connection
with interstate enhanced services); California v. FCC, 567 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978) (subjecting physically intrastate Bell System
local exchange facilities to FCC regulations requiring interconnection of interstate
communications lines).
172. See MemoryCall Preemption Order, supra note 142, paras. 10-12.
173. California 1, 905 F.2d 1217, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990).
174. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
175. Louisiana, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
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even if they do not conflict with federal law.176 Interstate communications
plainly is one such area. The Communications Act vests the FCC with
jurisdiction over "all interstate and foreign communications by wire or
radio."'" As the D.C. Circuit observed in NARUC 1, regulatory authority
over interstate communications is "totally entrusted to the FCC." '78 There
is, quite simply, no room for state regulation in this area.
The FCC's plenary authority plainly precludes a state from enforcing
a regulation that, on its face, purports to regulate interstate communica-
tions. 79 The states, moreover, may not do indirectly what they are
forbidden to do directly. This explains why the courts have consistently
turned back state efforts-such as Georgia's effort to declare MemoryCall
a purely intrastate service," ° or California's effort to have all network
BSEs subject to exclusive state tariffing -that would have allowed
states to regulate jurisdictionally interstate communications services by
"shifting the boundary" between the federal and state jurisdictions.
Other forms of state "jurisdictional gerrymandering" also are suspect.
For example, the suggestion made by several states that an enhanced
service session in which information crosses state lines can be "sliced up"
into a physically intrastate segment (subject to state regulation) and a
physically interstate segment (subject to FCC regulation), appears flatly
inconsistent with the principle that the jurisdictional nature of a communi-
cation is determined on an end-to-end basis. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the FCC's rejection of just this sort of an argument in the Georgia
PSC case. 2
Another seemingly impermissible form of "border shifting" can occur
if a state is able to require a carrier to allocate a disproportionate amount
of its costs for a given facility or service to the intrastate jurisdiction. In the
case of federally regulated basic telephone service, the FCC's jurisdictional
176. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698 (1984).
177. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
178. NARUC H, 746 F.2d 1492, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
179. See In re Operator Servs. Providers of America, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
6 FCC Red. 4475 (1991) (preempting a Tennessee statute, Public Chapter No. 675
(amending TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-5-206, 47-18-104 (1993)), expressly regulating
interstate communications services offered by operated service providers on the grounds that
the statute infringed on the FCC's plenary jurisdiction over interstate communications
services); see also AT&T v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 625 F. Supp. 1204, 1208
(D. Wyo. 1985) ("It is beyond dispute that interstate communication is normally outside the
reach of state commissions and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC.").
180. See Georgia MemoryCall Order, supra note 141.
181. See California H, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993).
182. Georgia PSC, No. 92-8257, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 24458 (11th Cir. Sept. 22,
1993); see supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
separations process ensures that the correct proportion of costs will be
assigned to the intrastate jurisdiction. This division is binding on the
states." 3 The FCC, however, has declined to apply the jurisdictional
separations process to facilities and services that are not regulated at the
federal level, such as inside wiring and enhanced services. 1" The Com-
mission also has announced that the states may adopt their own methods
to determine the proportion of a carrier's costs related to these offerings
that is within the intrastate jurisdiction."5
This approach is perfectly acceptable-so long as the states adopt
reasonable measures to determine what portion of the carrier's costs are to
be allocated to the intrastate jurisdiction."8 6 However, if a state were to
require carriers to assign all of their enhanced service and inside wiring
costs to the intrastate jurisdiction-even though these offerings are
jurisdictionally mixed-it would be able to exercise authority over
jurisdictionally interstate facilities and services. 7 This seems flatly
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Illinois Bell,
which recognized that, while considerable flexibility is allowed, it is
impermissible to "ignore altogether" the division between federal and state
jurisdiction by allocating all costs to the intrastate jurisdiction.'
Finally, the states cannot regulate interstate communications by
requiring the FCC to forgo exercise of its plenary interstate jurisdiction in
situations in which federal regulation would adversely affect the states in
implementing their policies. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in California
II, such "reverse preemption" has no place in the Communications Act." 9
When the FCC is acting within the scope of its plenary power over
interstate communications, it need not seek to accommodate divergent state
interests. 90
183. See Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 827 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).
184. See RAO Letter 16, supra note 50; RAO Letter 14, supra note 140, at 3522.
185. RAO Letter 16, supra note 50, at 5947; RAO Letter 14, supra note 140, at 3523.
186. Cf Crockett Tel. Co. v. FCC, 963 F.2d 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that the FCC
may allow states to use a "residual ratemaking" approach which uses industry-wide averages
to estimate the portion of small LECs' regulated costs that are within the intrastate
jurisdiction).
187. This is precisely what California has informed the FCC it would do. See supra note
50.
188. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 150-51 (1930); see supra note 140.
189. California H, 4 F.3d 1505, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he state is seeking to preempt
FCC regulation of communications, and this violates the [Communications] Act. .. '.
190. Of course, in the interest of comity, the FCC may wish to take state concerns into




C. The States are Entitled to Regulate Intrastate Communications
Services and Facilities
Under the division of responsibility embodied in the Communications
Act, the states have authority, in the first instance, to regulate common
carrer communications by wire or radio that originate and terminate within
the same state. They also may regulate physically intrastate facilities and
services used in connection with such communications to the extent of their
intrastate use. Because the vast majority of telephone calls in the United
States originate and terminate within the same state, 91 this gives the
states significant power within the "dual regulatory" system.
In exercising its power over intrastate common carrier communica-
tions, a state may seek to advance policies that are at odds with those
favored by the FCC. To the extent that the state is able to limit application
of its regulation to facilities and services within its jurisdiction, Section
2(b)(1) provides it with the right to do so, free from federal interference.
D. The FCC May Preempt State Regulations Applicable to Carrier-
Provided Intrastate Communications Facilities or Services to
the Extent that, as a Practical Matter, Enforcement of Such
Regulations Would Prevent the Application of Federal
Regulations to Interstate Carrier-Provided Communications
Services or Facilities
Avoiding conflicts between federal and state authorities would be a
simple matter if the two sides could be kept within their respective
jurisdictions, separated by an ironclad boundary. Obviously, they cannot be.
The same facilities and services are frequently subject to both FCC and
state jurisdiction. Whenever the two regulatory authorities seek to apply
different rules to the same offerings, some degree of jurisdictional tension
is inevitable.
1. The Preemption Principle
The cases decided over the last two decades provide the basis for
resolving federal-state conflicts. The decisions reflect a distinc-
tion-evident, although not discussed-between conflicts based on
divergent state policy regarding intrastate services, and conflicts based on
the de facto assertion of state jurisdiction over interstate facilities and
services. The cases teach that Section 2(b)(1) gives the states the right to
191. See supra note 19.
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advance their policies by applying their own regulations to common carrier
facilities and services within their jurisdiction. The fact that a -state may
adopt a policy that thwarts the FCC's achievements of its policy goals in
this area does not, in itself, provide a basis for federal preemption.
There is one-and only one-situation in which Section 2(b)(1)
allows the FCC to cross the jurisdictional divide and displace state
regulation of intrastate carrier facilities or services. This occurs when, as a
practical matter, the application of a state's regulations to jurisdictionally
intrastate carrier facilities or services would displace the FCC's ability to
apply its "rule of decision" to jurisdictionally interstate carrier facilities or
services. In such case, one sovereign or the other must give way. Under our
federal system, as embodied in the Supremacy Clause,"9 it is the states
that must defer.
The difference between a state adopting a divergent policy and a state
effectively asserting jurisdiction over interstate services is clearly illustrated
by comparing Louisiana with the NCUC cases. Louisiana involved a
difference in federal and state policy: the FCC wanted carriers to modernize
their plant quickly, the states wanted to keep telephone rates low. 93 The
fact that some states sought to achieve their goal by requiring carriers to
use relatively conservative depreciation methods for the "intrastate
component" of their plant doubtless thwarted the FCC's effort to promote
plant modernization. The FCC, however, was powerless to prevent the
states from doing so. The reason is simple: nothing the states did in the
intrastate jurisdiction threatened the ability of the FCC to apply its
depreciation rules within the interstate jurisdiction. 94
The NCUC cases also involved a policy difference. The FCC wanted
to allow a competitive CPE market; the states did not. Here, too, applica-
tion of the state policy would have "thwarted" the FCC's goals. Yet, in this
instance, the FCC's preemption order was upheld. The difference is
fundamental. In the NCUC cases, allowing the states to adopt a rule
preventing interconnection of user-provided CPE for intrastate communica-
tions, as a practical matter, would have resulted in subscribers using carrier-
provided equipment for both interstate and intrastate calls. The FCC's
ability to apply its "rule of decision" allowing interconnection of user-
provided CPE to the interstate network would have been eliminated.'95
The proper resolution of FCC-state conflicts has been made more
difficult by the semantic conventions used in the cases. Most courts have
192. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
193. See Louisiana, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
194. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
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phrased the preemption test in terms of goals and policies. The FCC is said
to be able to preempt state regulation that would either "thwart or impede"
or "frustrate" valid FCC goals.19 6 These phrases suggest that preemption
involves some sort of "balancing of interests" between federal and state
policies. Other decisions have stated that the FCC can only preempt state
regulation where it is "not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate
components" of a given regulation' 9 -- suggesting that the FCC is
powerless to challenge a state regulation if there is any conceivable way in
which divergent federal and state regulations can coexist.
What matters, of course, is what the courts do, not what they say.
However, considerable confusion would be avoided if the courts were to
formulate the preemption test in a manner that more clearly reflects the
underlying principles. Such a reformulated test might read as follows: The
FCC may preempt state regulations applicable to carrier-provided intrastate
communications facilities or services to the extent that the FCC concludes,
as a practical matter, that enforcement of such regulations would prevent
the application of federal regulations to interstate carrier-provided
communications facilities or services.198
The phrase "as a practical matter" is crucial. There are some cases in
which it is literally impossible for conflicting federal and state regulations
to coexist. For example, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in California III,
an FCC rule requiring carriers to disclose network interfaces six months
before introducing a new service cannot coexist with a state rule requiring
disclosure at an earlier date.'99 Initial public disclosure of a network
interface can be made only once; application of a divergent state rule would
196. California I, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990); accord NARUC //, 880 F.2d
422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (allowing the FCC to preempt state regulations that would
"rustrate" or "interfere with the Commission's valid goal[s]'); CCL4, 693 F.2d 198, 214
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983) (permitting preemption where state
regulation "would interfere with achievement of a federal regulatory goal").
197. Louisiana, 476 U.S. at 375 n.4; see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104, 114
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[Wlhere it [is] not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate
components of the [ ] FCC regulation involved... the Act sanctions federal regulation of
the entire subject matter.") (emphasis in original); ARCO, 886 F.2d 1325, 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (justifying preemption only if technological inseparability also prevents the FCC from
separating its regulation into interstate and intrastate components).
198. Interestingly, the very first of the preemption cases, NCUC I, provides language that
may come closest to best expressing the preemption test. FCC preemption was permissible,
the court indicated, where "state jurisdiction over interstate communications is exercised in
a way that, in practical effect,... [frustrates the FCC's] exercise of that plenary jurisdiction
over the rendition of interstate and foreign communications services that the Act has
conferred upon it." NCUC I, 537 F.2d at 793.
199. See California 11, 39 F.3d 919, 933 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
2435 (Apr. 3, 1995).
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inevitably displace the federal rule. The FCC plainly has the authority to
protect its interstate jurisdiction by preempting such rules.2"
In most situations, however, it is not "literally impossible" for
divergent federal and state rules governing the same facility or service to
coexist. In the NCUC cases, FCC rules allowing interconnection of CPE to
the network for interstate purposes could have coexisted with state rules
barring interconnection for intrastate purposes.20' In California Iff,
requiring carriers to use separate personnel and facilities to provide
intrastate basic and enhanced services, while allowing them to use the same
personnel and facilities to provide interstate basic and enhanced services,
was far from a physical impossibility.22
The fact that simultaneous application of divergent federal and state
rules was possible in the NCUC cases and California III was not disposi-
five. The decisive factor in those cases was that, as a practical matter,
application of the state rule would have displaced the federal rule. Thus, in
the NCUC cases, the Fourth Circuit recognized that no rational consumer
would have bought a competitively provided telephone to make interstate
calls if he was required to use a carrier-provided telephone to make
intrastate calls.20 3 If the FCC lacked preemptive authority, the state rule
barring interconnection of competitively provided CPE would have become
the applicable "rule of decision" in the interstate sphere as well. Similarly,
in California HI, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the likelihood that a
carrier required to employ separate personnel and facilities to provide
intrastate enhanced services would integrate its basic and enhanced services
at the interstate level was virtually non-existent.2" In the absence of
federal preemption, a state rule requiring structural separation at the
intrastate level also would have governed carriers' provision of interstate
enhanced services.
In reaching their conclusions about the practicality of divergent FCC-
state regulations, the courts have shown substantial deference to the
FCC.0" In effect, the courts have treated the FCC's determination as to
whether the coexistence of conflicting federal and state regulations is
"impractical" or "infeasible" as a matter within the FCC's expert judgment.
200. See id.
201. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
203. See NCUC I, 537 F.2d at 791.
204. See California MI, 39 F.3d at 933.
205. See, e.g., NCUC 1, 537 F.2d at 792 (deferring to the FCC's conclusion that it would
not be practical for customers to use one set of communications facilities for intrastate
communications, and another set for interstate communications).
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Under established administrative law principles, such determinations are not
disturbed unless they are found to lack record support or to be arbitrary and
capricious. 2°'
While the FCC's determination as to the need to preempt state
regulation is entitled to substantial deference, the Commission's decision
as to the extent of any preemption order is subject to more searching
judicial review. The courts have made clear that the FCC is under an
affirmative obligation to "narrowly tailor" any preemption order; it may
only displace state regulations to the extent necessary to protect its
interstate jurisdiction. The burden, moreover, is on the FCC to demonstrate
that it has done so.207 Were the Commission to go any further, it would
trample the 'jurisdictional fence" that Section 2(b)(1) erects around state
regulation of intrastate facilities and services.
The FCC's obligation to narrowly tailor its preemption of state
common carrier regulation is evident in both NARUC 1I and California I.
In neither case did the court suggest that the FCC was without preemptive
power. To the contrary, the D.C. and Ninth Circuits specifically identified
possible subjects of FCC preemption in the inside wiring and enhanced
services areas. 08 In each case, however, the court found that the FCC's
preemption order suffered from the same fatal defect: the order preempted
all state regulation of the subject. The FCC had made no effort to limit the
order to those state regulations that could not feasibly coexist with federal
regulations.209
While the FCC's duty to narrowly tailor its preemption orders is a
significant one, the Commission need not show that it has crafted the
narrowest possible preemption order.210 Thus, the FCC is free to reject
means of narrowing its preemption order that it concludes are not feasible.
For example, in Maryland PSC the D.C. Circuit rejected a claim that
federal preemption of state regulation of an LEC-provided telephone
disconnection service could be narrowed by requiring carriers to limit the
206. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
42-44 (1983).
207. See NARUC 11, 880 F.2d 422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
208. See California I, 905 F.2d 1217, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the FCC can
preempt state regulations requiring the use of separate facilities to provide enhanced
services); NARUC H, 880 F.2d at 430 (noting that the FCC can preempt state regulations
requiring bundling of basic service with CPE).
209. California I, 905 F.2d at 1244-45; NARUCHI, 880 F.2d at 431.
210. This is consistent with the principle, established in the Smith case, see supra note
50, that in establishing the line of demarcation between federal and state authority "extreme
nicety is not required, only reasonable measures being essential." Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 282 U.S. 133, 150 (1930).
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service to one that disconnected intrastate calls only. In reaching its
decision, the court deferred to the FCC's finding, based on the record, that
it was not technically feasible to limit the service in that manner.2"
The FCC also is not obligated to think of every conceivable method
of narrowing its preemption orders. Thus, in the ARCO case, the D.C.
Circuit declined to consider a suggestion by one of the intervening parties
that the FCC could have narrowed its preemption order by requiring ARCO
to limit the use of its interconnected microwave facilities to interstate calls.
As the court observed, "[t]he FCC bears the burden of showing that its pre-
emption order is necessary on the basis of the record developed before it.
The Commission is not, however, required to anticipate any conceivable
argument that might be raised by intervenors on appeal." '212
Finally, it seems indisputable that the FCC may exercise its pre-
emptive power to protect all aspects of its interstate jurisdiction-including
its Title I authority. The Communications Act does not expressly discuss
the affirmative scope of the FCC's preemption power. Rather, preemption
power is an adjunct to any lawful exercise of the FCC's authority. Thus,
the FCC may preempt state regulations under Title I, just as it may under
Title II. The only limitation is that, where common carriers are involved,
the FCC's preemption power must be exercised in a manner that is
consistent with Section 2(b)(1).
This conclusion has been repeatedly upheld in the courts. For
example, the Computer I order preempting state regulation of CPE was
adopted pursuant to the FCC's Title I authority.2" 3 This order was
affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in CCIA, which specifically considered
whether the FCC could preempt under its Title I power. In holding that it
could, the court stated that it "perceive[d] no critical distinction between
preemption by Title II regulation and preemption by the exercise of
ancillary [i.e., Title I] jurisdiction." 4 Three subsequent D.C. Circuit
decisions-Illinois Bell,z15 NARUC IJ, 2 16 and Maryland PSC2 17-all
upheld FCC preemption orders based on the Commission's Title I
211. Maryland PSC, 909 F.2d 1510, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing In re Detariffing of
Billing and Collection Servs., Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 1150, paras. 27-29 (1986));
see supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
212. ARCO, 886 F.2d 1325, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see supra notes 108-11 and
accompanying text.
213. Computer 1 Final Decision, supra note 40, paras. 122-84.
214. CCIA, 693 F.2d 198, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
215. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
216. NARUC III, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
217. Maryland PSC, 909 F.2d 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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authority."' The preemption order affirmed in California LU had the same
jurisdictional basis. As the Ninth Circuit recognized, these cases are fully
consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana.19
2. The Principle Applied
By its terms, the limit on FCC preemption contained in Section
2(b)(1) of the Communications Act applies equally to state regulations
governing "charges, classifications, practices, services, [or] facilities ...
[used] for or in connection with intrastate communication service." ° In
practice, however, the FCC's preemption power may vary significantly
from one area to another-depending on the feasibility of applying different
rules within the federal and state jurisdictions.
At one extreme is the question of depreciation. As the Louisiana case
makes clear, state imposition of a depreciation methodology to the
jurisdictionally intrastate component of a telephone company plant imposes
no impediment to the FCC's application of its own depreciation method-
ology to the interstate component. 1 There is, therefore, no room for
FCC preemption in this area.
A second area in which the FCC appears devoid of preemptive
authority is state regulation of purely intrastate carrier-provided services.
An example of such a service might be a burglar alarm service that uses
dedicated telephone lines to link residences within a state to a monitoring
facility elsewhere within the same state. It is not clear how many purely
intrastate carrier-provided communications services exist. Doubtless,
however, there are some.'m What is certain is that a state's decision to
apply its own regulations to a purely intrastate carrier-provided service
cannot oust the FCC of its jurisdiction over an interstate service. At most,
state regulation of such a service could frustrate the implementation of a
218. Illinois Bell upheld an FCC order that preempted state regulation inconsistent with
an FCC regulation requiring the BOCs to pay commissions to non-carrier CPE vendors that
market BOC-provided Centrex service. Illinois Bell, 883 F.2d at 116. NARUC I17 upheld in
part an FCC order that preempted state tariff regulation of carrier-provided inside wiring.
NARUC//, 880 F.2d at 431. And Maryland PSC affirmed the preemption of Maryland state
regulation of the rates of"DNP," a BOC-provided billing and collection service. Maryland
PSC, 909 F.2d at 1517. All of these carrier-provided services are subject to the FCC's Title
I jurisdiction.
219. California HI, 39 F.3d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
2435 (Apr. 3, 1995).
220. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
221. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
222. See California I, 905 F.2d 1217, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting evidence that some
alarm services, on-line educational database services, and voice mail services appeared to
be offered on a purely intrastate basis).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
federal policy-such as one favoring the non-regulated provision of
enhanced services. Such policy differences, however, do not provide a
sufficient basis for FCC preemption.
FCC preemption of state tariffs raises more difficult issues. The D.C.
Circuit's decision in NARUC I1I contains language that suggests that, while
it cannot preempt all state tariff regulation, the FCC could preempt state
tariffs that would "interfere with the Commission's achievement of its valid
goal[s]."'  The court's emphasis on advancing the FCC's policy goals
seems unsound. The relevant issue is whether imposition of state tariffing
requirements on intrastate services, as a practical matter, would prevent the
FCC from applying its rules at the interstate level.
In NARUC II, the FCC rule at issue required carriers to "detariff" the
interstate component of inside wiring. Arguably, it would be possible-if
a bit awkward-for the cost of the intrastate component of jointly used
inside wiring to be recovered through tariffs, while the cost of the interstate
component is recovered through competitively set prices. For example, a
state could require that a specified amount of the revenue from carrier sales
of inside wiring be applied to the carrier's intrastate regulated accounts.
Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the federal policy favoring
the detariffing of inside wiring. However, as long as the state tariff was
cost-based, the FCC still could apply its rule requiring the cost of carrier-
provided inside wiring to be recovered through market transactions, with
the proceeds (in excess of the state tariff) assigned to the carrier's interstate
unregulated accounts. 4
At the same time, however, there doubtless are situations in which the
FCC may preempt state tariffing regulations. For example, as the D.C.
Circuit concluded in NARUC I11, the FCC was plainly within its authority
to preempt state tariff provisions that bundle inside wiring with basic
transmission service.' Inside wiring either is, or is not, provided as part
of the regulated transmission service. Requiring the "intrastate component"
to be provided as part of the regulated transmission offering inevitably
would prevent application of the FCC's rule requiring the unbundling of the
"interstate component" of inside wiring from the basic interstate common
carrier network.
Outside of the tariffing area, the FCC's ability to preempt state
regulations of carrier-provided services seems considerably greater. Many
state rules govern the terms and conditions under which a communications
223. NARUC III, 880 F.2d 422, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see supra notes 75-78 and
accompanying text.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 431.
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service will be provided or the obligations of the carrier to do, or refrain
from doing, a particular act. The FCC's structural separation requirements
and nonstructural safeguards plainly fall within this category. In some
cases, simultaneous compliance with inconsistent federal and state rules will
be a literal impossibility. In many other instances, there will be no practical
way for the carrier to comply with inconsistent rules. In either situation, the
FCC has ample authority to protect its plenary jurisdiction over interstate
communications services through the use of its preemption power.
III. KEEPING THE PEACE
The principles outlined above provide a basis on which the FCC and
the states can move forward cooperatively. At the same time, however, it
is only natural to anticipate that, as the communications market continues
to develop, new issues of intergovernmental relations will need to be
addressed. Four of these issues are described below.
A. Inseverability and the Intelligent Network
One situation in which FCC preemption is permissible occurs when
the inability to physically separate the interstate and intrastate components
of a given facility or service makes it impossible for divergent federal and
state regulation to exist. This situation is sometimes referred to as
"inseverability." 6
This situation is illustrated by the Georgia PSC and Maryland PSC
cases. In Georgia PSC, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the FCC's conclusion
that there was no possible way, given current technology, to prevent the use
of BellSouth's voice messaging service, MemoryCall, in connection with
intrastate calls, while allowing the service to be used in connection with
interstate calls." Similarly, in Maryland PSC, the D.C. Circuit deferred
to the FCC's finding that it would not be technically possible for an LEC
to offer a service that cuts off customers' ability to use their telephone for
226. Physical inseverability, it should be noted, does not always provide a basis for FCC
preemption. FCC preemption is permissible only if physical inseverability makes it
impractical for the FCC to apply its regulations to interstate facilities or services. The
telephone company plant at issue in Louisiana, for example, could not be physically
"severed" into discrete interstate and intrastate components. Yet, because the jurisdictional
separations process provided a means to apply divergent federal and state depreciation rates,
the Supreme Court held that the FCC's order preempting state regulation of carrier
depreciation rates was unlawful. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
227. See MemoryCall Preemption Order, supra note 142, para. 19 ("lIt is impossible
as a practical matter to separate the interstate and intrastate provision of [MemoryCall] to
permit effectuation of the Georgia Order only for the intrastate provision of the service.");
see supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
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intrastate telephone calls, while allowing them to continue to have full use
of their telephones for interstate calls. 8 Because it was not possible to
limit the physical consequence of state regulation to the intrastate sphere,
the courts held that the FCC could preempt state regulations that were
inconsistent with the Commission's rules.
Technology is not static. The introduction of new "advanced
intelligent network" features, such as Signaling System 7, has increased the
capabilities of the carriers' networks. 9 If it is not here already, there will
soon come a time when technology makes it possible to determine the
jurisdictional nature of any communication. Once this occurs, it will be
possible for a carrier to offer an "interstate only" voice messaging service
or an "intrastate only" telephone disconnection service, thereby making
divergent federal and state regulation physically possible. These techno-
logical developments will require the courts to rethink the validity of cases
such as Georgia PSC and Maryland PSC.
One possibility is that the courts will conclude that-where techno-
logical advances make physical separation of federal and state components
of a facility or service possible-FCC preemption is no longer permissible.
That, however, is not the inevitable result. The courts may, for example,
decline to require carriers to make use of new technologies to physically
separate interstate and intrastate facilities services if the FCC concludes that
doing so would be unreasonably costly or would degrade network
efficiency.230
Even if technology makes it practical to physically separate additional
services into intrastate and interstate offerings, the courts still might find
228. See Maryland PSC, 909 F.2d 1510, 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing In re Detariffing
of Billing and Collection Servs., Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 1150, paras. 27-29
(1986)); see supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
229. Signalling System 7 has been described as "a form of out:of-band signaling between
switches (i.e., signaling separate from the call itself) that dramatically reduces call set-up
time, permits queries to centralized databases in the processing of calls, and permits the
introduction of such services as Caller ID." KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, § 11.6.1 n.16.
230. The FCC previously has concluded that requiring carriers to deploy:
expensive additional equipment simply because of jurisdictional conflicts would
violate our congressional mandate in Section 1 of the Communications Act to
regulate "interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire or radio so
as to make available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio communications service
with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."
In re American Tel. & Tel. Co. & the Associated Bell Sys. Cos. Interconnection with
Specialized Carriers in Furnishing Interstate Foreign Exchange (FX) Serv. and Common
Control Switching Arrangements (CCSA), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d




that federal preemption is permissible where-as a practical matter-the
service could be marketed only on a jurisdictionally mixed basis. As the
D.C. Circuit observed in Illinois Bell, "[m]arketing realities might
themselves create inseparability."" 1 Again, the Georgia PSC case
provides a ready example. A good argument can be made that a voice
messaging service that only stores messages that originate out-of-state
would not be commercially viable. Therefore, a state regulation that
prevents a carrier from offering voice messaging service for use in
connection with intrastate calls, as a practical matter, also would prevent
it from offering such a service in connection with interstate calls. Because
this would preclude application of the FCC's rules allowing for the
provision of interstate voice messaging service, federal preemption might
still be appropriate.
B. "Jurisdictional Forbearance" After MCI v. AT&T
One way in which conflicts between sovereigns are sometimes
avoided is through the exercise of comity. In effect, one sovereign
recognizes that-while it has jurisdiction in a given area-it will decline
to assert its authority in the interest of good relations with the other
sovereign." Within our federal system, such arrangements also can
promote administrative efficiency.
The FCC has deferred to state regulations in numerous areas. For
example, the FCC has declined to require federal tariffing of certain LEC-
provided services, such as Centrex or call waiting, even though these
services can be used in conjunction with both interstate and intrastate
communications. 33 Similarly, the Commission has declined to assert
authority over private line networks on which less than 10 percent of the
traffic is jurisdictionally interstate. 34
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. AT&T 35 calls into question the continued ability of the FCC to
231. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104, 113 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
232. The Supreme Court first recognized the concept of international comity in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812).
233. See ONA Order, supra note 149, para. 85 n.156 (noting that services such as "call
forwarding and call waiting often are tariffed with states," but that the FCC had jurisdiction
to apply federal ONA requirements to them); Rlinois Bell, 883 F.2d at 114 (noting that,
while the costs of Centrex service are recovered through local tariffs, "this regulatory
accounting treatment does not negate the mixed -interstate-intrastate character" of the
service).
234. See In re WTS and WATS Mkt. Structure, Decision and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 5660
(1989).
235. MCI, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
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decline to regulate jurisdictionally interstate services in the interest of
comity. In MCI, the Court struck down the FCC's "permissive detariffing"
policy, under which the Commission did not enforce the requirement,
contained in Section 203 of the Communications Act, that "[e]very common
carrier" shall provide interstate basic telephone service pursuant to filed
tariffs. 6 The FCC sought to justify its "forbearance" policy on the
grounds that exempting "non-dominant carriers" from the tariff filing
requirement would promote competition. 7 The Court flatly rejected this
argument. "Compliance with [the statutory tariffing] provisions," the Court
held, "'is utterly central to the administration of the Act."' ' The FCC
did not have authority to ignore this requirement in order to achieve its
policy goals. 9
Comity, it can be argued, is a kind of forbearance: the FCC declines
to regulate basic common carrier service-plainly subject to its jurisdiction
under Title II-in order to advance a policy goal, such as better relations
with the states or administrative efficiency. The Supreme Court's decision
in MCI v. AT&T could be read to suggest that such a course of action is
impermissible because it ignores the mandatory requirement in the
Communications Act that interstate basic services be provided pursuant to
federal tariffs. On the other hand, it is possible to distinguish the two
situations. The FCC's "permissive detariffing" policy sought to eliminate
tariff regulation of more than 40 percent of all interstate basic services.
Here, in contrast, the FCC is merely transferring administration of certain
categories of rate regulation from the federal to the state level. This
236. 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1988) (emphasis added).
237. The term "non-dominant carrier" refers to a provider of basic telephone service that
lacks market power, defined as the ability to restrict output and keep prices above
competitive levels. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Servs., First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, paras. 54-65 (1980). This term
includes all long distance carriers other than AT&T, which continues to have approximately
a 60% share of the interexchange market. FCC, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS Div., LONG DISTANCE
MARKET SHARE Tmnn QUARTER 9 (1994). In the Competitive Carrier proceeding, the
Commission concluded that requiring non-dominant carriers to file tariffs is unnecessary,
because such carriers lack the power to charge unreasonable or discriminatory prices, and
counter-productive, because it can facilitate oligopolistic pricing. See In re Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs., Second Report and Order, 91
F.C.C.2d 59 (1982), reconsideration denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983).
238. MCI, 114 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary Steel, 497 U.S.
116, 132 (1990)).
239. Id. at 2233; see also Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515, 1519 (D.C.
1995) ("Congress enacted the Communications Act and the mandates of the Act are not
open to change by the Commission.... The Commission may not... ignore congressional




distinction may provide a sufficient basis for the continuation of the FCC's
comity policy.
C. Jurisdiction Over Telephone Company-Provided Video Services
Congress created the rules governing federal-state relations in an age
in which communications and voice telephony were nearly synonymous.
The convergence of communications and computing during the 1970s and
1980s required the courts and the FCC to apply these rules to enhanced
services. The impending "multimedia convergence"--which will see the
combination of telephony, consumer electronics, and video program-
ming-doubtless will raise new issues about the division of regulatory
authority between the FCC and the states.
For the last several years, the FCC has been developing a regulatory
regime designed to allow LECs to enter the video programming market in
order to provide a competitive alternative to cable service, which generally
is provided on a monopoly basis. The ability of the LECs to do so has been
limited, however, by the terms of the "cross-ownership" restriction
contained in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, which prevents
an LEC from providing "cable service" in its telephone service area.2'
To get around this restriction, the FCC in the late 1980s developed the
concept of "video dialtone." The notion was that-while the cross-
ownership ban precluded them from acting as video program "packag-
ers"--the LECs could act as conduits, delivering programming provided by
others. In so doing, the FCC reasoned, LECs would simply be performing
their traditional common carrier role.241
The Video Dialtone Second Report and Order242 considered the
division of authority between the FCC and the states regarding video
dialtone. The FCC initially concluded that video dialtone was a purely
interstate service. In reaching this decision, the Commission analogized
video dialtone to early cable systems, in which physically intrastate
telephone company "channel service" was used to deliver broadcast
240. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
241. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, First Report and Order and Second Further Notice ofInquiry, 7 FCC
Red. 300 (1991), reconsidered, 7 FCC Red. 5069 (1992), aff'd, National Cable TV
Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
242. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules §§ 63.54-63.58, Second
Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 FCC Red. 5781 (1992) [hereinafter Video Dialtone Second Report and
Order], afid, National Cable TV Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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signals-which are subject to exclusive federal regulation243-- to end-
users. Like channel service, the .FCC declared, an LEC's video dialtone
facility is an "'integral component in an indivisible dissemination system
which forms an interstate channel of communication"' and, therefore, is
subject to exclusive federal regulation.2'
The states promptly responded, correctly observing that video dialtone
is not simply channel service: the content is not limited to retransmitted
broadcast signals, and, moreover, some of the video content originates and
terminates exclusively within a single state. 45 Recognizing its error, the
FCC pulled back. "[W]e have exclusive jurisdiction," the Commission
announced on remand, "over all [interstate] video dialtone services ....
[S]tates have jurisdiction over the delivery by wire of video programming
... within the same state .. -"246
The devil, as always, is in the details. In its Video Dialtone Reconsid-
eration Order, the FCC concluded that the states' jurisdiction over
intrastate video dialtone service is limited to situations--such as the
operation of a "video library"-in which video program originates at one
location within a state and is delivered, by wire, to another point within the
same state.247 Any transmission involving radio, the Commission insisted,
remains subject to exclusive federal regulation. While the Reconsideration
Order is a step in the right direction, it may not go far enough. In the FM
Subcarrier Case, the D.C. Circuit held that the states have jurisdiction over
the common carrier aspects of intrastate radio.24 Video dialtone service,
by definition, is the common carriage of video signals. The FCC's decision
to assert jurisdiction over the common carriage by radio of intrastate video
dialtone programming is hard to square with the D.C. Circuit's ruling.
The relationship between the FCC and the states in this area is likely
to become more complex. In the last year, courts in five circuits have
struck down the cable-telco cross-ownership restriction as unconstitu-
243. The Court has long held that broadcasting is subject to exclusive FCC jurisdiction.
See, Turner Brdest Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994);
Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee,
412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
244. Video Dialtone Second Report and Order, supra note 242, para. 72 (quoting General
Tel. Co., 413 F.2d 390, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
245. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Reconsideration and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Red.
244, paras. 113-19 (1994).
246. Id. para. 123.
247. Id.
248. The FM Subcarrier Case is described supra note 74.
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tional.249 As a result, most LECs have obtained the right to package their
own programming and deliver it directly to subscribers. Arguably, this will
allow the LECs to act as cable systems operators, rather than common
carriers.
The provision of cable service is governed by Title VI of the
Communications Act." The jurisdictional division of authority is
significantly different in Title VI than it is in Title II. In essence, Title VI
gives the states the right to franchise cable systems, but requires them to
regulate cable service pursuant to specific federal directives governing the
prices, terms, and conditions of service. The net result is that-if LEC-
provided video programming is regulated as cable service-states may lose
authority to adopt regulations governing even purely intrastate LEC-
provided video programming. 1 The fact that an LEC may provide such
programming over the same facilities that it uses to provide basic intrastate
telephone service further complicates matters.
D. Jurisdiction Over Non-Carrier Communications Facilities and
Services
As a result of the growth of competition during the last decade, many
functions-such as the provision of CPE, inside wiring, and enhanced
services-that once were performed exclusively by telephone companies are
now also performed by entities whose main business is not the provision
of basic telephony." The ability of the FCC and the states to exercise
regulatory authority over these "non-carriers" has yet to be explored by the
courts.
Non-carriers, by definition, are not common carriers. Therefore, they
are not subject to federal regulation under Title II of the Communications
249. US West v. United States, No. 94-35775 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1994); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United
States, 153 F.R.D. 1 (D. Me. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Ill. 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
250. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
251. The FCC recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment on the
extent to which LECs that provide their own programming should be regulated pursuant to
Title II, Title VI, or some combination thereof. See In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-
Ownership Rules, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Dkt No. 87-266,
paras. 9-17 (Jan. 20, 1995).
252. Indeed, in many segments of the market, non-carriers are the leading provider. See,
e.g., OFFICE OF INDUSTRIES, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, INDUSTRY & TRADE
SUMMARY: TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT 5 (Oct. 1994) (listing selected U.S. firms in
the telecommunications industry). One reason for this situation is that, under the terms of
the Modification of Final Judgment, see supra note 57, the BOCs are prohibited from
manufacturing telecommunications equipment and CPE.
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Act. Any authority that the FCC has in this area must be grounded in Title
I, which authorizes the FCC to regulate interstate "wire and radio
communication." 2"3 The extent to which non-carrier-provided services and
equipment can be classified as "communications," however, is unset-
tled. 4
The FCC has avoided the difficult problem of determining the extent
of its Title I jurisdiction over non-carriers by deregulating all enhanced
services, CPE, and inside wiring at the federal level." The states, too,
generally have not sought to subject non-carrier-provided equipment and
services to regulation. However, some states have suggested that they might
be interested in asserting regulatory authority over the intrastate activities
of non-carriers in certain instances-especially in the enhanced services
253. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The extent of the FCC's Title I authority is discussed infra
note 255.
254. In the First Computer Inquiry, the FCC tried to establish a clear line of demarcation
between communications, which was to be subject to FCC regulation, and "data processing,"
which was not. See In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence
of Computer and Comm. Servs. and Facils., Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267,
paras. 5-11 (1971), afl'd sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 732-36 (2d Cir.
1973). Over time, however, it became clear that the dividing line between the two could not
be precisely established. For example, enhanced services combine carrier-provided transport
service with computer processing applications. Similarly, CPE can facilitate communications
and provide information storage and processing applications.
255. See Computer It Final Decision, supra note 40, paras. 25-26. While the FCC's
decision not to regulate these services has obviated the need to determine the extent of the
FCC's jurisdiction, a reasonable argument can be made that at least some types of non-
carrier-provided CPE, inside wiring, and enhanced services constitute communications
facilities and services and, therefore, are subject to its Title I jurisdiction. That is not to say
that the FCC's Title I authority is unlimited. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court has
observed, the FCC's Title I authority is "restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's various responsibilities." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 178 (1968). For example, the FCC presumably could not impose the full array of Title
II tariff requirements on a service that was subject to its Title I authority. See California I,
905 F.2d 1217, 1240 n.35 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Title 1] confers on the FCC such power as is
ancillary to its specific statutory responsibilities."); see also Computer I Final Decision,
supra note 40, para. 126 ("Even though an activity falls within [the FCC's Title I]
jurisdiction, [the FCC's] ability to subject it to regulation is not without constraints ....
[C]ommission regulation must be directed at protecting or promoting a statutory purpose.
In some instances, that means not regulating at all .... .').
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area. 6 This raises the question of whether, if a state were to adopt such
a policy, the FCC could exercise its preemptive authority.
The ability of the FCC to displace inconsistent state regulations is, of
course, circumscribed by Section 2(b)(1). However, the Ninth Circuit's
statement, in California I, that Section 2(b)(1) "applies to communications
services provided by common carriers .. as distinguished from communi-
cations services provided by non-carriers' lu7 suggests that the provision
does not limit FCC jurisdiction over non-carriers. Where Section 2(b)(1)
does not apply, the Supreme Court has recognized that the FCC has plenary
power to "pre-empt any state or local law that conflicts with [valid federal]
regulations or frustrates the purposes thereof." ' A strong argument can
be made, therefore, that the FCC could preempt all state regulation of non-
carrier-provided communications equipment and services. 9
This interpretation does lead to a somewhat anomalous result: the
FCC's ability to preempt state regulation of carrier-provided communica-
tions equipment and services (over which the FCC has clear authority) is
limited, while its ability to preempt state regulation of non-carrier-provided
communications equipment and services (where its authority is more
uncertain) is plenary. The fact that this result is anomalous does not, of
course, mean that it is incorrect.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed principles governing relations between the
FCC and the states. These principles recognize the right of the Federal
Communications Commision and the states to pursue divergent policies,
provided that the two sovereigns remain within their respective juris-
256. See Investigation of the Regulation of Enhanced Services, Formal Case No. 904,
Order to Show Cause (D.C. PSC Oct. 31, 1990) (directing all ESPs within the District of
Columbia to show cause why they should not be subject to local common carrier
regulation); Testimony of California Public Utilities Commission Chairman C. Mitchell
Wilk, En Bane Hearing: Networks of the Future (FCC May 1, 1991) (suggesting that, under
California law, it might be obligatory to regulate "hundreds" of firms that "offer computer-
related services').
257. California I, 905 F.2d at 1240.
258. City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (upholding the FCC's preemption of
state regulations governing cable signal standards even though there was no conflict with
federal law).
259. In a petition filed in 1991, a group of non-carrier ESPs asked the FCC to rule that,
in Computer i, it had preempted state regulation of non-carrier-provided enhanced services
and that the Ninth Circuit's subsequent vacation of the Computer 111 Orders reinstated this
decision. See Petition for a Declaratory Ruling that States and the District of Columbia Are
Preempted from Imposing Public Utility Regulation on Enhanced Service Providers, Public
Notice, 6 FCC Red. 1363 (1991). The FCC has never acted on this petition.
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dictions. They also recognize that, in cases in which divergent federal and
state regulations cannot practically coexist, state regulation must give
way-but only to the extent necessary to avoid encroaching on the federal
domain. By adopting these principles, the FCC and the states can put an
end to their internecine conflict. The time has come to give peace a chance.
